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The modern era began in 1500 with the Renaissance in Italy,
the European discovery of the Americas, and a Reformation in
Christianity. These events led to an incredible explosion of eco-
nomic prosperity and religious conflict. While the modern era is
ending, the beginning of the new era is marked by an incredible
explosion of world-wide prosperity under the quasi-religious de-
signation of "globalization"-and a world-wide religious conflict
has developed around the growth and expansion of radical Islam.
Although standards to restrain and channel the economic
forces of globalization still need to be developed, one of the mod-
ern era's last achievements was the 1948 adoption of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR").' The UDHR is aspi-
rational in that it does not carry the force of law. Nevertheless,
the United Nations has issued covenants and declarations calling
on the nations of the world to come forth and bind themselves to
the principles enunciated in the UDHR. Regional covenants and
conventions, such as the European Convention on the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Con-
vention"), have been modeled after UDHR provisions and carry
the force of law. In whatever form they appear, the UDHR has
become the "coin of the realm" when it comes to human rights
world-wide.2 Countries who only give lip service to its concepts-
* Copyright Gordon Butler, 2009. Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of
Law, Miami, Fla.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR], available at http://www.
ohchr.orgfEN/UDHR/Documents/UDHRTranslationseng.pdf.
2. See John Witte, Jr., The Spirit of the Laws, and the Laws of the Spirit: Religion
and Human Rights in a New Global Era, in 2 GOD AND GLOBILIZATION: THE SPIRIT AND
THE MODERN AUTHORITIES, 76, 78 (Max L. Stackhouse & Don S. Browning eds., 2001)
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while in practice failing to comply with its provisions-feel com-
pelled to recognize and agree to its provisions, albeit with reser-
vations.
There seems to be widespread acknowledgment that the source
of the modem idea of human rights is traceable to the Enligh-
tenment, and credit is given to Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Mill,
and others who were instrumental in "secularizing" philosophy in
the Western tradition.3 Without denying the importance of these
writers, this article seeks to lay out in brief fashion the biblical
doctrines, particularly their development through the time of the
English Revolution, that laid a permanent foundation upon which
these later writers would construct the freedoms that are incor-
porated into the human rights regime. This article is titled A Re-
ligious Critique because it demonstrates that the three pillars of
the human rights regime-human dignity, rule of law, and un-
iversality-are just as easily supported by religious thought as
philosophical thought in the modern world.
Part II sets forth the principal provisions of the human rights
regime as they apply to religious practice, such as freedom of reli-
gion and the rights to an education and participation in govern-
ment. It also reviews the Preamble to the UDHR and the stated
reasons and goals of its adoption in 1948.
Part III analyzes various theories that are put forth to support
each of the three human rights pillars. In evaluating such theo-
ries, it becomes obvious that no single theory can support the
weight of human rights regimes in a cross-cultural sense. Conse-
quently, Part III also covers theories recognizing that a consensus
can be reached in society as to the ends sought, even though a di-
versity of societal views prevents agreement on a common basis
supporting those ends. However, such theories generally reach a
minimal definition of human rights.
Part IV suggests that a major flaw infecting all attempts to jus-
tify the human rights regime is a presumption that religious rea-
soning is irrelevant to human rights discussions, and to permit
("The language of rights has long been common coinage in the currency of global
law .... ").
3. See Yeshoshua Arieli, On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Emer-
gence of the Doctrine of the Dignity of Man and His Rights, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN
DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 1, 5 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002)
[hereinafter THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY].
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such reasoning would render the human rights regime unaccept-
able to other cultures. That is, to be acceptable in modern
thought, a theory cannot admit a religious foundation because a
religious foundation cannot be universal. Part IV then describes a
number of major contributions from Christian theology, a belief
system which developed concepts such as religious liberty, popu-
lar sovereignty, and separation of church and state and made
possible the recognition of the importance of human dignity, the
rule of law, and universality. Particularly important to religious
liberty was recognition that the biblical model made plain that
civil government had no authority over religious matters and
should be constrained to "secular" matters as defined in the
second table of the Ten Commandments.
Ultimately, this author sees human rights as a by-product of
Christianity's centuries-long quest for freedom from oversight
and control by civil and ecclesiastical establishments and for the
individual conscience to worship freely and without fear. In short,
religious freedom is the foundation of other rights and has led the
way to their recognition.
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
The United Nations was created in the aftermath of World War
II as a forum for the nations of the world to come together, dis-
cuss problems, and structure solutions without resorting to war.4
The adoption and propagation of the UDHR reflects the belief
that certain values are universal, are essential to a proper ac-
knowledgment of the inherent dignity of man, and limit the scope
of state action. The UDHR Preamble recognizes that "the inhe-
rent dignity [ ] of the equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world."5
Article 1 of the UDHR provides that "[a]ll human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a
spirit of brotherhood."6
4. See generally BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Sales No. E.OO.I.21
(2000), available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/history.htm.
5. UDHR, supra note 1, at pmbl.
6. Id. at art. 1.
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Equality, dignity, and inalienable rights are also the corner-
stones of America's Declaration of Independence.7 The freedoms
of religion, speech, press, and association, along with the assur-
ance of a republican government, are embodied in the United
States Constitution.' This formula has worked well in the West,
but was the result of centuries of intense conflict. The United Na-
tions hopes to impart the blessings of such liberty throughout the
world without the need for such conflict. The Preamble continues:
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have re-
course, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression,
that human rights should be protected by the rule of law...
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have ... reaffirmed their
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person and in the equal rights of men and women .... 9
Among the rights and freedoms protected by the rule of law are
the right to participate in government, the freedom to choose
one's religion, and the right to an education. Freedom to partici-
pate in government is set out in Article 21 of the UDHR:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives .... 3. The will of
the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures.
10
Freedom of religion is set out in Article 18 of the UDHR, which
provides that "[elveryone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching practice, worship and observance.""
7. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (declaring that "[w]e
hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their creator with certain inalienable Rights that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness").
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. UDHR, supra note 1, at pmbl. (emphasis added).
10. Id. at art. 21
11. Id. at art. 18; see TAD STAHNKE & J. PAUL MARTIN, RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
BASIC DOCUMENTS 59 (1998) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS] (defining religion to include
non-religions such as atheism and agnosticism thereby expanding the coverage of Article
18).
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Article 18 is built "on the philosophical assumption that the in-
dividual as a rational being is master of his (her) own destiny."12
The "freedom" it embodies is defined as follows:
"Freedom consists in being able to do anything that does not harm
another person. This fundamental starting point of the original Dec-
laration of Human Rights from the French Revolution (1789) is just
another formulation of the famous "golden rule" of the Jewish-
Christian tradition: "what you don't want to be done to yourself,
don't do it to someone else." 13
Participation in government and religious freedom are the
foundations of Western liberal democracies. The glue that holds
them together is the belief that universal education passes the
legacy of freedom to succeeding generations. 4 Recognizing the
importance of education to the establishment of "universal" val-
ues, the UDHR Preamble proclaims:
[Tihis Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common stan-
dard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to pro-
mote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive meas-
ures, national and international, to secure their universal and effec-
tive recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member
States themselves and among peoples of territories under their ju-
risdiction.
15
The right to an education is broadly stated in the UDHR and
incorporates a duty on the part of the state to teach due respect
for the human rights norms set forth in the UDHR."6 Article 26 of
the UDHR provides:
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, ...
in the elementary ... stages .... [And] ... shall be compulsory ....
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and
12. MANFRED NOwAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 309-10 (1993).
13. Anton Houtepen, From Freedom of Religion Towards a Really Free Religion, in
FREEDOM OF RELIGION: A PRECIOUS HUMAN RIGHT 43 (Jonneke M.M. Naber ed., 2000)
(stating that "[tihe philosopher Immanuel Kant would reformulate the same rule into
what he called 'the categorical imperative': always act in such a way, that what you do
could, in a similar case, be wise for all other people to do").
14. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop trans., The University of Chicago Press 2000) (recognizing the important
role religion played in the democratic education of the population).
15. UDHR, supra note 1, at pmbl. (emphasis added).
16. Id. at art. 26.
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fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance
and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and
shall further the activities of the United Nations for the mainten-
ance of peace.
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that
shall be given to their children.
17
The precise basis and nature of the human rights regime is
disputed. The bases on which human rights have traditionally
been justified, such as natural law, utility, culture, experience,
and positive law, are all disputed."8 There seems to be a common
agreement that human rights should be recognized, even though
agreement might be elusive on whether they should be viewed as
(i) divine, moral, or legal rights; (ii) validated through intuition,
culture, custom, social contract, distributive justice, or as prere-
quisites to happiness; (iii) revocable or irrevocable; or (iv) broad
or narrow.19 Human rights are characterized as universal, fun-
damental, justiciable as well as aspirational, and limited by the
rights of others. Essentially:
[H]uman rights are understood to represent both individual and
group demands for political power, wealth, enlightenment, and other
cherished values or capabilities, the most fundamental of which is
respect and its constituent elements of reciprocal tolerance and mu-
tual forbearance in the pursuit of all other such values or capabili-
ties.... At bottom, human rights qualify state sovereignty and pow-
er, sometimes expanding the latter even while circumscribing the
former .... 20
Protection of human rights takes various forms. In the United
States, many European countries, and throughout the world, pro-
visions in national constitutions provide basic protection.2 In ad-
dition, human rights protections are incorporated into interna-
tional and regional agreements, many of which are modeled after
the UDHR.
The ideals of the UDHR are incorporated into two international
covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
17. Id.
18. 20 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 656 (15th ed. 2002).
19. See id.
20. RICHARD PIERRE CLAUDE ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 20
(2006).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I (ensuring freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and
redress of grievances); 1958 Const. pmbl. (Fr.) reprinted in JOHN BELL, FRENCH
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 245 (1992) (declaring that "[t]he French people solemnly proclaims
its attachment to the rights of man").
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Rights ("ICCPR")22 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 23 These covenants limit
governmental and private action, seek to compel certain actions
on the part of states, and are referred to as the "International Bill
of Rights" ("IBR").24 The necessity that called for a distinction be-
tween the two international covenants was the Cold War conflict
between democratic countries, which stressed individual civil
rights, and Communist countries, which stressed community and
cultural rights.25 The need for this distinction has passed some-
what into history since the end of the Cold War.26
In 1950, the nations of Europe adopted the European Conven-
tion and established the European Court of Human Rights.2 ' This
court has the most extensive experience in dealing with problems
of human rights and religion.
III. HUMAN DIGNITY, RULE OF LAW, AND UNIVERSALITY
The UDHR is seen as the instrument that transformed the
United Nations from a simple organization established to mediate
relations between sovereign states into "an instrument for the re-
construction of the international community upon the highest
ideals and ethical norms of a humanistic conception of man and
22. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOc.
E 95-2 (1978), U.N.T.S. 171.
23. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S.23.
24. See id.; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 22,
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET NO. 2 (REV. 1), THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1996), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu6/2/fs2.htm. United Nations international covenants have addressed the first
generation through the ICCPR and the second generation through the ICESCR. While
these are the primary covenants that address religion and education, the United Nations
has adopted additional instruments that bear on these subjects such as the United Decla-
ration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Reli-
gion or Belief, the "1981 Declaration Against Intolerance," the UNESCO Convention
Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as
numerous regional conventions.
25. See Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1758,
1765 (2008).
26. See Posting of Diane M. Amann to Slate, http://www.slate.com (Apr. 21, 2008,
17:26 EST); see also Posner, supra note 25, at 1765 (stating that today, most countries
have ratified both treaties).
27. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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mankind." 28 The human rights regime is bound up in three essen-
tial concepts: human dignity,2s rule of law,3 ° and universality."
Each of these concepts has been the subject of intense debate and
controversy, proving them extremely difficult to define.
Rights have been called "entitlements pertaining to those needs
and desires that other people are obligated to fulfill, or to allow
you to fulfill."32 The focus is on the individual, and the rights are
passive as well as active, but they are generally minimalistic and
"pertain[ ] to what is decent, rather than to what is good."3 3 The
idea of rights is often seen as emanating from the Enlightenment,
which witnessed the breakdown of societies that had previously
provided individuals with a sense of dignity and a place in the
world and the subsequent rise of the nation state and its imper-
sonal interactions with the population.34 Thus, the dignity of the
individual requires protection from the authority of the group.35
The drafters of the UDHR intentionally stated the concepts in
terms of moral universals, without any overt reference to religion,
in order to obtain worldwide agreement. 36 But religions often
claim a universal world view encompassing all humans, and reli-
gions have historically formed society's moral foundations. The
28. THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 3, at 3.
29. See generally THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 3.
30. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY, 110-
11 (2004) (citing T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM 21-22 (1993)).
31. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY: THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALISM
(Andrds Saj6 ed., 2004) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY].
32. RICHARD AMESBURY & GEORGE M. NEWLANDS, FAITH AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
CHRISTIANITY AND THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN DIGNITY 25 (2008).
33. Id. at 26-27.
34. See id. at 29 (citing Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Ana-
lytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 303, 312
(1982). It is also asserted that someone looked behind the social contract theories of Locke
and Rousseau and suggested that at some point, the powerless in society became unwilling
to beg the powerful for a handout, thereby making human rights a right and not a privi-
lege. Id. at 30 (citing ANNETTE C. BAIER, MORAL PREJUDICES 225-26 (1994)).
35. See AMESBURY & NEWLANDS, supra note 32, at 29.
36. Helen Stacy, International Human Rights in a Fragmenting World, in HUMAN
RIGHTS WITH MODESTY, supra note 31, at 161, 162. Stacy explains:
Enunciating rights without explaining why people have them was also a phi-
losophical response to two confounding chapters in history-the revelation
that the Holocaust had been perpetrated under the name of the rule of law
and the experience of Stalinism as a stifling of individual agency together
galvanized philosophy to subvert the religious concept of truth and to replace
it with the less metaphysical concept of freedom.
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three "Abrahamic" Religions-Judaism, Christianity, and Islam-
all claim universal application, which is the fundamental as-
sumption of the Hebrew, Christian, and Muslim holy books."
There is one God over all the world and everyone in it. Universal
legal principles are found in the Ten Commandments, and uni-
versal human dignity is found in the imago dei of the biblical cre-
ation narrative. 3' There are a number of religious and non-
religious attempts to ground the morality of human rights.39
Michael Perry strongly suggests that human rights can only be
supported on a religious ground.4 ° At the heart of the human
rights regime, he sees a twofold moral conviction that each and
every (born) human being-each and every member of the species
homo sapiens-has inherent dignity and is inviolable; not-to-be-
violated.41
Perry lays out a religious defense of the "conviction that every
human being has inherent dignity and that we should live our
lives accordingly."42 Using scripture, the source of inherent hu-
man dignity is the fact that "every human being is a beloved child
of God and a sister/brother to every other human being."4 3 There-
fore, since God is who He is, the world is what it is, and we are
who we are, then the most satisfying life is one in which we "sis-
ters and brothers" love one another as Christ has loved us and
37. See MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 23, 23-26 (1955);
Willtherberg, Judaism and Christianity: The Unity and Difference, J. BIBLE & RELIGION
67, 69-70 (1953); Richard W. Lee, Christianity and the Other Religions: Interreligions Re-
lations in a Shrinking World, 53 SoC. ANALYSIS 125, 129 (1992).
38. See Robert G. Kennedy, Corporations, Common Goods, and Human Persons, 4
AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 8 (2006); Michael S. Paulsen, Is St. Paul Unconstitutional?, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 1, 5 (2006).
39. See, e.g., MICHAEL MARTIN, ATHEISM, MORALITY, AND MEANING 12 (2002) (arguing
that morals and ethics are possible without religious beliefs); LINDA T. ZAGZEBSKI, DIVINE
MOTIVATION THEORY xii-xiv (2004) (arguing that morals are driven by the attractiveness
of the good and that God provides the best exemplar for these good emotions).
40. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW,
COURTS 14-29 (2007) [hereinafter TOWARD A THEORY]. While some commentators might
find a basis for human rights in the sense of awe created by mankind, Perry rejects such a
subjective view and asserts that we must find the objective sacredness of man in order to
find a reason for granting them respect. AMESBURY & NEWLANDS, supra note 32, at 48 (cit-
ing MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 27 (1998)).
41. TOWARD A THEORY, supra note 40, at 5. Perry further asserts, "again, one violates
a human being, according to the morality of human rights, if one's reason for doing some-
thing to, or for not doing something for, a human being denies, implicitly if not explicitly,
that the human being has inherent dignity." Id. at 7.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id. at 24.
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taught us to love one another.' This satisfying life produces love
for your enemies, those who violate you, and those who fail to re-
spect your inherent dignity.4 By living this satisfying life, we
"'fulfill our created nature and ... achieve our truest, deepest,
most enduring happiness."'46 For Perry, fundamental moral ques-
tions cannot be addressed without also addressing, at least impli-
citly, religious questions.
Perry questions whether any non-religious ground can support
the two-fold conviction that "every human being has inherent
dignity and is inviolable."48 To state it differently, every human
being has inherent dignity and we should live our lives according-
ly. 4' He doubts that a non-religious ground supports "'the una-
shamedly anthropomorphic,.., claim that we are sacred because
God loves us, his children."'5 ° Perry cites non-religious sources
who have recognized the philosophical difficulties in asserting
why we "should" recognize inherent human dignity.51
Perry finds the approaches of John Finnis, Ronald Dworkin,
Martha Nussbaum, and Richard Rorty inadequate.52 He finds
Finnis's claim that it is unreasonable for a human being who val-
ues his own well-being to intentionally harm the well-being of
another to be patently untrue, because Perry asserts that it is not
44. Id. at 12. "God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God in him."
John 4:16 (New King James). "A new commandment I give to you, that you love one
another; as I have loved you, that you also love one another." John 13:34 (New King
James).
45. See TOWARD A THEORY, supra note 40, at 10.
46. Id. at 11 (citation omitted).
47. See id. at 12.
48. Id. at 14.
49. Id. at 14-15.
50. Id. (citation omitted).
51. Perry quotes Jeffrie Murphy as recognizing philosophy's difficulty in finding a ba-
sis for human rights:
[T]he liberal theory of rights requires a doctrine of human dignity, precious-
ness and sacredness that cannot be utterly detached from a belief in God or
at least from a world view that would be properly called religious in some me-
taphysically profound sense .... [T]he idea that fundamental moral values
may require [religious] convictions is not one to be welcomed with joy [by
nonreligious enthusiasts of the liberal theory of rights]. This idea generates
tensions and appears to force choices that some of us would prefer not to
make. But it still might be true for all of that.
Id. at 17 (citing Jeifrie Murphy, Afterword: Constitutionalism, Moral Skepticism, and Re-
ligious Belief, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION 239, 248 (Alan S.
Rosenbaum ed., 1988) (emphasis added)).
52. See id. at 18-29.
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unreasonable for human beings to find those closest to them to be
of more worth than other human beings.
3
Dworkin sees sacredness (both secular and religious) in the
sense of wonder produced in every human being by the process of
human reproduction, in which each person is a "'creative master-
piece' of natural as well as human creation.54 For Perry, it is ob-
vious that such a consensus does not exist and the value placed in
the creative process is neither intrinsic nor uniform.15 Nussbaum
follows Dworkin in suggesting that "'the good of other human be-
ings is an end worth pursuing in its own right, apart from its ef-
fect on [one's] own pleasure or happiness."'56 Nussbaum answers
the normative "should" question by noting that it is a basic social
emotion of human beings to care for one another.5 For Perry,
such care is empirically unverifiable since we cannot say that the
Nazis cared for the Jews or the Turks cared for the Armenians. 5
Citing Nietzsche, Perry asserts that it is naive to think that "'mo-
rality could survive when the God who sanctioned it is miss-
ing!',5 9
An answer to the "should" question provided by evolutionary
biology is that man's nature evolved so as to produce the inherent
dignity and the desire to love and care for one another."° Again,
Perry rejects such reasoning as not only not accepted by secular
philosophers, but also totally implausible because it is being as-
serted as a unique characteristic rather than as part of a greater
view of creation.61
Rorty would deny there is any such thing as human nature,
choosing instead to define human characteristics as the result of
socialization and historical circumstances in which man has been
freed from the theological or metaphysical realms, so that it is
now possible to "substitute Freedom for Truth as the goal of
53. Id. at 18-19.
54. Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 22 (citing Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Lite-
rature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714, 718 (1994)).
57. Id. at 22.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 23 (citing FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 147 (Walter Kauf-
mann ed., Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967)).
60. Id. at 23-24.
61. Id. at 23-25.
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thinking and of social progress." 2 Rather than spreading the hu-
man rights culture by arguing from transcultural norms, Rorty
would simply acknowledge the Western origin of human charac-
teristics and suggest that if others follow our example, they may
achieve the same results."3 Perry asserts that this explanation
will not be satisfactory to anyone who sees social wrongs as de-
termined not by social norms, but as violations of the essential
normative order of the world.14 If the human rights regime con-
sists of no more than Eurocentric sentiments and preferences,
then any others are merely a statement that our sentiments and
preferences are better than yours, since there is no moral com-
pass that judges between us.65
Perry summarizes non-religious attempts to find a moral
ground for human rights by likening such attempts to a child who
pulls a plant from the ground without its roots and expects it to
grow in another location. 6 Perry does not seek to prove that there
is no such non-religious ground, but only to suggest that it may
not exist-and that if it does not exist, and if any religious ground
is a fantasy, "then there is no ground for the morality of human
62. Id. at 26 (citing RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xiii
(1989)).
63. Id. Rorty suggests:
[Tihe rhetoric we Westerners use in trying to get everyone to be more like us
would be improved if we were more frankly ethnocentric, and less professedly
universalist. It would be better to say: Here is what we in the West look like
as a result of ceasing to hold slaves, beginning to educate women, separating
church and state, and so on. Here is what happened after we started treating
certain distinctions between people as arbitrary rather than fraught with
moral significance. If you would try treating them that way, you might like
the results.
Id. at 27 (citing Richard Rorty, Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY:
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 19-20 n.9 (Ron Bontekoe & Marietta Stepaniants eds.,
1997)).
64. Id. at 27.
65. See id. at 28.
66. Id. at 14. Perry quotes Leo Tolstoy:
Attempts to found a morality outside religion are similar to what children do
when, wishing to replant something they like, they tear it out without the
roots and plant it, rootless, in the soil .... [Rieligion is a particular relation-
ship that man establishes between his own separate personality and the infi-
nite universe, or its origin. And morality is the permanent guide to life that
follows from this relationship.
Id. (citing LEO TOLSTOY, A CONFESSION AND OTHER RELIGIOUS WRITINGS 150 (Jane Ken-
tish trans., 1987)).
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rights, no warrant for the claim that every human being has in-
herent dignity and is inviolable.""7
At the other end of the spectrum from Perry and those present-
ing non-religious foundations for human rights is Alasdair Mac-
Intyre, who denies even the existence of human rights, and fa-
mously suggested that "belief in them is one with belief in witches
and in unicorns." By rights, he refers to those that belong to
human beings simply as human beings. His argument is essen-
tially that the success of the Enlightenment in creating modern
man as an "individual moral agent" by freeing him from the ex-
ternal restraints of divine law, natural theology, hierarchical au-
thority, or teleology has left man devoid of any moral rules or te-
los having an independent and objective authority.69 This is true
of the attempt by utilitarians to provide the greatest happiness or
the Kantians' effort to identify standards through reason.7" Mod-
ern society, according to MacIntyre, is left with "emotivism,"
which is "the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more
specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are
moral or evaluative in character."71 Thus, any attempt at provid-
ing a foundation for human rights is destined to fail.
Recognizing the extremes of this debate, the IBR is built on
three controversial and hard-to-define concepts: human dignity,
rule of law, and universality, each of which is discussed in the fol-
lowing pages.
A. Human Dignity
The core value protected by the UDHR is "the inherent [hu-
man] dignity... of all members of the human family."72 "Inherent
dignity" is (along with "equal and inalienable rights") recognized
as the "foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."73
Human beings are "born free and equal in dignity and rights...
67. Id. at 26.
68. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 69 (2d ed.
1984).
69. Id. at 68.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 11-12.
72. UDHR, supra note 1, at pmbl.
73. Id.
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[and] are endowed with reason and conscience," with the result
that all human beings should act in a "spirit of brotherhood." 4
People are called to "reaffirm[ ] their faith.., in the dignity and
worth of the human person."75 One contributor to a recent volume
on human dignity emphasizes that:
[Tihere is one term in the Universal Declaration that cannot be
tucked away nor separated from its sources, namely, "the Inherent
Dignity of all human beings."
It is the concept and term of "the inherent Dignity" that carries the
whole burden of being the fountainhead from which the equal rights




Dignity... has emerged as a convergence point for what is perceived
to be a non-ideological humanistic point of departure towards a so-
cial liberal ideal.... In that sense, human dignity appears to stand
as an absolute value, being the actualization of certain basic political
and moral values such as liberty, self-determination, and equality,
while being the paramount value, which in its inalienability and in-
violability is at the source of an extended value system that has the
capacity to project an assembly of constitutional values.77
These statements begin the task of defining "inherent dignity,"
a task which the UDHR sidesteps.7' The ICCPR asserts that
"these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human per-
son," but it is unclear how this is so, except to the extent that the
authors of the UDHR identified those values which must be en-
forced and protected by the rule of law so that people could resist
tyranny and oppression without the need for rebellion. 79 Resis-
tance to tyranny focuses on individual rights, but the UDHR goes
further and incorporates social and cultural rights (such as a
right to an education), all of which are claimed to be "inherent"
and to preexist creation of the UDHR (e.g., "the peoples...
74. Id. at art. 1.
75. Id. at pmbl.
76. Arieli, supra note 3, at 8.
77. David N. Weisstub, Honor, Dignity, and the Framing of Multiculturalist Values, in
THE CONCEPT OF HuMAN DIGNITY, supra note 3, at 263, 263.
78. Klaus Dicke, The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, in THE CONCEPT OF HuMAN DIGNITY, supra note 3, at 111, 118.
79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
DOC. A16316 (Mar. 23, 1976), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/htm.menu3/b/a-ccpr.
htm.
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have.., reaffirmed their faith in... the dignity and worth of the
human person").,0
Because human dignity is such a broad concept, there are nu-
merous approaches to defining it. Many commentators find it dif-
ficult to see a foundation in law, philosophy, ethics, or religion
upon which to build, other than the Enlightenment argument
that human rights are "self-evident" and can be defined, as stated
in the UDHR, by "reason and conscience."" This is more than ob-
jective reasoning alone; it incorporates "conscience" as a subjec-
tive reaction. 2 Although human dignity supports human rights
claims, human dignity does not define a substantive norm from
which each claim can be deducted. 3 Instead, each claim must be
"conditioned by historical, economic, political, cultural or even fi-
nancial circumstances of the society in which it is articulated." 4
One approach finds a triad of values in the UDHR: "freedom,
equality and participation in a political, social and international
order."" The approach then suggests that when any of these
three values are endangered, a proper "respect for human dignity
calls for a human rights policy" and intervention. 6
Other approaches define human dignity not as an ethical con-
cept but as a "(theological-) anthropological frame of reference"
that can be used to establish boundaries within which ethics and
law operate." This frame of reference sees human rights as a "ju-
ridical concretization of the more general concept of [h]uman
[d]ignity" that existed prior to human rights, and therefore be-
longs to the pre-ethical, pre-political, and pre-juridical realm.8 As
an anthropological assertion, four notions of human dignity are
suggested: 9 (1) as envisioned by the Stoic Philosophers,9 ° human
80. UDHR, supra note 1, at pmbl.
81. Id. at art. 1.
82. Id.; see also Dicke, supra note 78, at 117. Klaus Dicke is Professor of Political
Theory and History of Ideas at Friedrich Schiller-University Jena, Germany. Because the
UDHR chose "reason and conscience" over reason alone, Dicke suggests the UDHR follows
Rousseau and Kant rather than Voltaire or the Encyclopedists and establishes equality
around moral reasoning. Dicke, supra note 78, at 117.
83. Dicke, supra note 78, at 118.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 119.
86. Id.
87. Dietrick Ritschl, Can Ethical Maxims Be Derived from Theological Concepts of
Human Dignity?, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 3, at 87, 92.
88. Id. at 92.
89. Id. at 95-97.
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dignity is axiomatic in nature and is inherent and inalienable;9 1
(2) as a biblical tradition, human dignity is imparted to man as
created in the image of God rather than inherent in man;9 2 (3)
from Hobbes and Locke, who saw that human dignity existed
prior to the state, but was vulnerable and in need of protection by
the willful actions of the state which confers it through the social
contract;9" and (4) from Kant, who saw humans elevated above
nature and endowed, not with the imago dei, but with a reason-
ing power that enabled them to exercise freedom and follow the
moral imperative never to treat others as a means, but rather as
an end.14
These four concepts suggest that human dignity must be
grounded in a creed, but that grounding it in an ontological or
quasi-empirical assertion of inherent human dignity creates diffi-
culties of definition because of wide individual and cultural dif-
90. It is commonly asserted that the Stoic conception of man is the basis of all univer-
salistic conceptions of political philosophy, from the Renaissance until the Age of Enligh-
tenment. This assertion reflects the secularization of the theory of the law of nature be-
ginning with Suarez and Althusius, who introduced the theory that contract is the basis of
social and political relations. Arieli, supra note 3, at 13 & n.31. He continues with a de-
scription of the important contribution of Grotius. Id. at 13 n.31.
91. Cicero is credited with the first use of term "dignity of man" and his comments can
be traced through Renaissance thinkers through Kant and the Enlightenment. Hubert
Cancik, "Dignity of Man" and "Persona" in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks on Ciero De
Officis 1105-07, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 3, at 19. In Cicero's trea-
tise, ON APPROPRIATE ACTIONS, it is stated:
But it is important for any disquisition on appropriate action to bear in mind
how much the nature of man has precedence over cattle and other beasts ....
But also, if we consider what excellence and dignity is in the nature of man,
we'll recognize how shameful it is to be dissolved in luxury and to live in a
spoilt and weak way, and how virtuous in a moderate, continent, severe, and
sober way.
Id. at 20-21 (citation omitted). Cancik continues:
The text sets forth Stoic anthropology and morals as follows: [t]he human
mind ... constitutes the fundamental difference between man and animal; it
is the foundation of moral decision . . . and behaviour .... Nature herself has
imposed this persona...; it is common to all human beings. This is the "first
persona;" it bestows excellence and distinction on man over all other living
beings.... From it, the dignity of man is derived.
The second role is individuality; the third is formed by the historical situa-
tion by which we are shaped; and the fourth is made by our own free will.
Id. at 21.
92. Ritschl, supra note 87, at 95.
93. Id. at 96.
94. Id. at 96-97.
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ferences. 5 Furthermore, a Stoic view, which finds God in every-
thing, would be summarily rejected. 6
Each approach has supporters. One suggestion is to follow the
biblical tradition of having human dignity imparted from outside,
while recognizing that it is imparted to a person not by God, but
by the words and actions of others. 7 This concept would place the
weight on the way one treats others, rather than on the one who
asserts the right on his own behalf, and is applicable to every
person simply for being a human being.98 Such a definition focus-
es on the actions of others, somewhat in the light of Kant.99
The French Revolution is credited with the idea that dignity
can only be justified by acknowledging it as an innate element of
every human being. 100 A humanist view of freedom, derived from
scholastic theology and the Renaissance, centers on a high view of
man:
[T]he existential freedom, the potential powers of man to raise him-
self to the highest levels of excellence in understanding, virtue, holi-
ness and creativity, his capacity of change and progress, raise man
to the central position in the created world .... Seen in this light,
freedom and the possibility for self-determination are the necessary
attributes for man and the rights follow logically from man's status
of worth, dignity and creativity.
10
'
Still, it is important to remember the compelling biblical narra-
tive deeply embedded in the Western Christian world. Such an
approach finds wide acceptance:
[Ilf no theological value is attributed, namely that dignity, as the
core of personhood, is not attached to the image of God in Creation,
the ontological origin of the concept remains as puzzling as giving
any other highly-valued concept such as privacy a specific place in
the hierarchy of values. This dilemma becomes apparent when other
values have to be interpreted according to exact terms.
10 2
95. Id. at 97-98.
96. Id. at 95-98.
97. Id. at 98.
98. Id. at 95-96.
99. Id. at 96-97.
100. Joern Eckert, Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law, in THE CONCEPT OF
HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 3, at 41, 45. The categorical imperative was restated by Kant
as: "Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of
another, always as the end, never merely as the means." Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
101. Arieli, supra note 3, at 10.
102. Weisstub notes:
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The importance of the imago dei is seen in the Book of Genesis,
in which the death penalty is the only punishment equivalent to
the crime of murder because man is made in the image of God. 10 3
Many Jews and Christians avoid or reject the death penalty as an
infringement on the dignity of man, while others deny any con-
nection between the modern idea of human dignity and these an-
cient concepts of the sanctity of blood and the imago dei.'14
For Christian and secular thinkers alike, recognition of ration-
al thought and free will was the starting point for a knowledge of
human dignity.15 Darwinism tended to undermine the traditional
supports for human dignity, God's image, and man's superiority
to animals. 106 Man's self-determination is seen as a motivation to
seek a "true knowledge of the created world" and a rejection of a
transcendent interpretation of that world. 10 7 As history is viewed
as "the movement toward human autonomy, the concept of the
city of man-the saeculum-has been reinstated and has inhe-
rited the city of God."' The conflict between (and separation of)
sacrum and saeculum (church and state) has had a profound ef-
fect on the development of freedom within Western Christendom,
although prior to the modern era the sacrum was dominant.' 9
It is in the nature of all constitutional decision-making structures in Western
society to have attempted, since the earliest inception of legal narrative, to
locate the values of a given legal order in an ultimate source, whether it was
in the pronouncement of the deity or in higher order values as the embodi-
ment of pure or ultimate reason.
Weisstub, supra note 77, at 267.
103. Yair Lorberbaum, Blood and the Image of God: On the Sanctity of Life in Biblical
and Early Rabbinic Law, Myth, and Ritual, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY, supra
note 3, at 55, 57-58. Lorberbaum's main focus, imago dei, is found in the Book of Genesis:
"Whoever sheds the blood of man by man shall his blood be shed for in God's image did He
made man." Id. at 57 (citing Genesis 9:6).
104. See id. at 84.
105. See Christian Starck, The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human
Dignity and Its Place in Modern Constitutions, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY, supra
note 3, at 179, 180. Starck continues and recognizes Pufendorfs belief that "human dignity
provides the basis for morally anchored freedom and equality" and Kant's idea that hu-
mans are morally autonomous but subject to a moral duties. Id. at 181-82.
106. Daniel Statman, Humiliation, Dignity and Self-Respect, in THE CONCEPT OF
HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 3, at 209, 210.
107. Arieli, supra note 3, at 6.
108. Id. at 7 (emphasis added); see also infra note 339 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing St. Augustine's book).
109. Arieli, supra note 3, at 11-12. Arieli asserts that these "elements are the neces-
sary conditions for the development of legal-political thought of universal significance." Id.
at 12. He continues:
The fusion of these two ultimate conceptions of human life into one civiliza-
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Jews and Muslims reject the distinction and see a unity in the
law: the Torah was given to Moses for Jews and the Qur'an was
given to Mohammed for Muslims.11°
Dignity and human rights can also be approached by expand-
ing "dignity" in such a way as to create a framework for identify-
ing human rights violations.' This is done in policy-oriented ju-
risprudence, which aims at establishing "a world public order of
human dignity."1 2 Advocates identify eight categories of values
(i.e., human aspirations) that are claimed to be "logically exhaus-
tive, but empirically open," and then suggest that a deprivation of
any such value (especially the value of respect) constitutes a hu-
man rights infringement. 1 3 The eight values defining human
dignity are the desire for respect, power, enlightenment, well-
being, wealth, skill, affection, and rectitude.' Each value can be
expanded into a set of preferred policies relating to the world
process of value fulfillment and deprivation."5 The supreme chal-
lenge, then, for those who wish to observe:
the world community as a whole is assisting those who are identified
with rivalrous and hostile systems of faith, belief, and loyalty to
perceive common values, and to cooperate in consolidating an effec-
tive public order which is designed to defend and extend common
tion, which took place with the Christianization of the Roman Empire, seems
to be a prescription of instability. Yet it was indeed this permanent tension
between the secular authority of the Empire and the religious authority of
the Church, the co-existence of church and state, which was decisive for the
shaping of the mentality of the West and the emergence of a secular culture
and civilization which characterize Modern History.
Id.
110. The commonality is described as follows:
Both realms form a unity under the all-embracing authority of the Shari'a
. ..The law is not man-made; it was given as command of precepts to all
Israel in Judaism and to the whole world in the Dar el Islam. One law and
rule of beliefs order the behavior and relations of men in society and their be-
liefs and faith in the Islam through the Shari'a and in Judaism through the
Halacha.
Id. at 16.
111. Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Hu-
man Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 316, 317-18 (1999).
112. Id. at 334.
113. Id. at 318-19.
114. Id. at 318.
115. MYREs S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-cHu CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 381-99 (1980).
2009] 1273
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
values. In today's world the principal systems of political myth are
secular ("liberal," communist," etc.) rather than sacred ("Christian,"
"Muslim," etc.).'
16
Thus, policy-oriented jurisprudence is seen as including both
secular as well as religious systems in an integrated analytical
framework of values.'17 Its goal is to maximize access by all to the
processes which shape and share the things humans desire and
value."' One such value is rectitude, i.e., aspiring to live up to the
standard of responsibility and to justify and celebrate these
norms in religious, metaphysical, or ethical terms. 9 Religion is
thus integrated into this analytical and aspirational frame-
work. 20 Interestingly, McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen's perceived
challenge of communism has markedly receded, and the then-
unforeseen religious challenge from Islam has emerged. 2'
Notwithstanding the difficulties of definition, human dignity
has become central in some recent European constitutions 122 and
in the Basic Law of Israel. 2' As the willingness to accept absolute
values waned after World-War 11,124 constitutionalism became
"the receptacle from which to draw important references about
116. Id. at 371.
117. See id. at 376.
118. See id. at 374-75.
119. Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 44
GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 96, 108 (2001) (citation omitted).
120. See id.
121. See ADEEB KHALID, ISLAM AFTER COMMUNISM: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN
CENTRAL ASIA 1-2 (2007). In proposing this intricate system of values under which the
world should congregate, the author sees a parallel with the development of international
law in the seventeenth century by Grotius and others, and notes that the time of Grotius
was a time when the most evocative symbols were theological. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)
was first a theologian and later a jurist. See HAMILTON VREELAND, JR., HUGO GROTIUS:
THE FATHER OF THE MODERN SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 156, 164 (1917) (citation
omitted). In his 1622 book, The Truth of the Christian Religion, Grotius asserted the supe-
riority of Christianity over paganism, Judaism, and Islam, and that it was "as certain as
the truth of reason." MASTERPIECES OF CHRISTIAN LITERATURE: IN SUMMARY FORM 432-36
(Frank N. Magill, ed. 1963) (summarizing Grotius's arguments).
122. "Human dignity shall be inviolable." Grundgetz ftir die Bundesrepublik Deust-
chland [GG [Basic Law] May 23, 1949, Federal Law Gazette [BGBL] art. 1; Starck, supra
note 106, at 179-80.
123. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391, available at http://www.
knesset.gov.illaws/speciallengbasic3_eng.htm.
124. For example, it has been noted that the effort to place human dignity as the ulti-
mate value in the legal order is relativism, which evolved in the 1930s from American Le-
gal Realism and which opposes any ontological certainty about absolute values. Weisstub,
supra note 77, at 268.
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core values in a democratic liberal state."12' Human dignity has
now become a mainstay of values, and constitutional experts
"have become the modern philosophers of values for their socie-
ties."'26 The source of societies' moral values has shifted from reli-
gion to jurists: "In constitutional law, basic freedoms for demo-
cratic behavior are conceived and elaborated upon in our societies
that have dismissed religion as the source for infusing moral con-
tent into the law. Constitutionalism has taken up the space of the
clarifier of fundamental values."127
In American jurisprudence, privacy and non-discrimination-
which go to the core of human dignity-have become the centra-
lizing principles for human autonomy and respect, and have be-
come the standard-bearers for such rights as the right to contra-
ceptives, abortion, and equality of sexual preferences. 28 These
principles also undermine dominant religious values. The prob-
lem with such centralizing principles is that one is never certain
how they will be used or developed in any given situation to drive
the value agenda in a specific society. Like human dignity, these
principles lack clear definitions and obfuscate "any clear under-
standing about its legal ontology. 129
Finally, expanding the concept of human dignity to encompass
all rights, including individual, group, and developmental rights,
may overburden the concept, thereby making it meaningless. One
commentator puts it this way: "Today, the concept of human dig-
nity has become ubiquitous to the point of clich6-a moral trump
frayed by heavy use, a general principle harried by constant invo-
cation." 3 '
125. See id. The concept developed in American analytical jurisprudence. Id.
126. Id. at 271.
127. Id. Weisstub states:
It has been an essential characteristic of American legal liberalism in the
twentieth century to downplay both the efficaciousness and moral integrity of
taking the historical common law direction of covering cases through existing
rules within the system .... In contrast, the American constitutional ethos
has been to expand the discretionary force of judges by the mandates of high-
er principles, accepting the belief that it is only through such principles that
the integrity of the system can be squarely lodged.
Id.
128. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973).
129. Weisstub, supra note 77, at 271-72.
130. John Witte, Jr., Between Sanctity and Depravity: Human Dignity in Protestant
Perspective, in IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY 119, 121 (Robert P. Kraynak & Glen Tind-
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B. Rule of Law
The rule of law is considered "the preeminent legitimating po-
litical ideal in the world today, without agreement upon precisely
what it means."131 If there is widespread agreement across many
fault lines on any one point, it is that "the 'rule of law' is good for
everyone."'32 It has been observed that "no government in the
world today openly rejects the rule of law, while many govern-
ment leaders pay public homage to it."'33 Moreover, the rule of
law is the fundamental protection afforded human rights, as
stated in the preamble to the UDHR: "Whereas it is essential, if
man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights
should be protected by the rule of law."'34
Although the UDHR does not specifically define the rule of law,
its presence is recognized throughout the UDHR.135 In fact, it is
often thought of as a panacea for every social ill, with the ability
to retrieve order from chaos. One commentator, Martin Krygier,
asserts:
It still seems to me a "cultural achievement of universal signific-
ance," if only because the sources of threat and confusion throughout
the world are so pervasive that a life without the rule of law, virtual-
ly anywhere today, is likely to be worse than a life with it. And in
most cases, very much worse. But what "it" will turn out to be in any
particular case is best known, perhaps only known, after the event,
and ... as human goods go it is at times somewhat qualified.
136
Going further, Krygier highlights the important truth that, to
be effective in society, the rule of law must compete with other in-
fluences in society and force decisions contrary to those de-
manded by those other influences. 137 In other words, law must
er eds., 2003).
131. TAMANAHA, supra note 30, at 4. However, expenditure of hundreds of millions of
dollars and several decades has produced minimal results indicating the difficulty in es-
tablishing the rule of law in areas where it has not been established. Id. (citing Thomas
Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 96, 103-04 (1998)).
132. Id. at 1.
133. Id. at 141.
134. UDHR, supra note 1, at pmbl.
135. See id.
136. Martin Krygier, False Dichotomies, True Perplexities, and the Rule of Law, in
HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY, supra note 31, at 277.
137. Krygier states:
The only time the rule of law can occur, when law might then be said to rule,
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rule even though it is not known what makes law rule. Empirical
evidence suggests that rule of law is incredibly difficult to estab-
lish where it does not already exist."' One condition for its devel-
opment is that political power be diffused and available for use by
the courts.'3 9
The rule of law is seen as a necessary condition on which to
build the future. 4 ° First, it is a universal truth in a global world,
and a way to simplify complex realities in a diverse world; second,
it is appealing to our need for a check on arbitrary power.' 4 ' The
rule of law is analogized to Adam Smith's "invisible hand," bring-
ing a natural order to situations without the intervention of hu-
man intention:
It promises order without bureaucracy; governance without govern-
ment; social choice without politics. Just as the invisible hand of the
market produces wealth without intentional human agency, the
black box of legal reasoning resolves social and economic disputes
without moral judgment or political bias. In an age when politics and
social engineering are reviled as wasteful and corrupt, the rule of
law presents itself as the perfect complement for a free-market based
view of development, offering to fix whatever problems the market
fails to fix on its own.
It is asserted that the rule of law is a necessary prerequisite to
support legal institutions that promote economic growth, al-
though there is little empirical evidence that supports such an
assertion. 43 Nevertheless, the rule of law is brought forth as a
panacea for almost any social problem or method of bringing sta-
bility out of chaos. 4'
But the rule of law has its fair share of critics, some of whom
claim that its overuse can tend to dilute its usefulness and im-
pact. For example, critics recognized that, as governments ex-
is when the law counts significantly, is distinct and in competition with
sources of influence, in the different realms of thoughts and behavior, the
normative economy, and significant sectors of a society. But we do not know
what makes law count.
Id. at 266.
138. See id. at 265.
139. Frank K Upham, The Illusory Promise of the Rule of Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS WITH
MODESTY, supra note 31, at 282, 284-85.
140. See id. at 279-80.
141. Id. at 280.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 279.
144. See id. at 312-13.
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panded into social welfare states, judges were asked to apply
open-ended standards like fairness or good faith and to make val-
ue choices about how best to achieve legislatively established pol-
icy goals, all of which tended to undermine traditional rule of law
criteria.145
In a broad account of the ingredients of the rule of law, it is
suggested that the rule of law should focus on three concepts.146
First, government is limited by law. 147 Second, there is formal le-
gality which requires public, prospective rules to have the quali-
ties of generality, equality of application, and certainty.'48 Third,
the rule of law requires some balance and self-restraint in appli-
cation so that the law does not descend into rule by judges.'49
There are signs that these concepts are being accepted around the
world, providing hope that the rule of law will have an influence
in the future. 5 °
C. Universality
The human rights regime is summed up as follows: "All human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are en-
dowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood."' 5 ' These remarkable words
purportedly apply to every person, regardless of any external cir-
cumstance, and transcend every national border, race, economic
status, or any other category, natural or created. In this regard,
human rights reflect a unique presumption of Western law that
its basic precepts and assumptions need to take on a universal
145. TAMANA-IA, supra note 30, at 82-83.
146. Id. at 114
147. Id. at 114-19.
148. Id. at 119-22.
149. Id. at 122-26.
150. Id. at 1, 3, 141.
151. UDHR, supra note 1, at art. 1.
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character.152 That is, they are assumed to apply everywhere and
to all people:
In brief, the current surge of concern for human rights represents
the potential development of a universal "doctrine" about humanity
in community, implying a social ethic. Contained in this doctrine is
the implicit assertion that certain principles are true and valid for
all peoples, in all societies, under all conditions of economic, political,
ethnic, and cultural life. Further, human rights implies that these
principles are somehow present in the very fact of our common hu-
manity, properly understood.
153
Claiming universal rights and defining them has proven more
difficult than first imagined.'54 Events in the twentieth century
worked to undermine the certainty of any consensus on which
values should be promoted to shape political and social rela-
tions.'55 The result has left open the question of whether human
rights have a transcultural content.1 6 One commentator notes a
shift from religious truth to freedom as an ontological basis for
giving human rights legitimacy:
Enunciating rights without explaining why people have them was
also a philosophical response to two confounding chapters in histo-
ry-the revelation that the Holocaust had been perpetrated under
the name of the rule of law and the experience of Stalinism as a stifl-
ing of individual agency together galvanized philosophy to subvert
152. Man's "inherent dignity" is placed as the basis for recognizing that "all human be-
ings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Id. The Theistic world view is clearly
seen as a fusion between Jewish-Christian and classical and humanists views of man.
Arieli, supra note 3, at 9. This fusion resulted in the West conceiving its basic assumptions
and norms in universal terms and basing its "first principles and basic values on secular
norma and principles." Id. at 7, 11. This is unique in the West. Id. at 11. It is asserted that
"[a]nthropoligical studies confirm that in all cultures law shares with religion four ele-
ments: ritual, tradition, authority, and universality." HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTER-
ACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 25 (1974)) (citing HUSTON SMITH, THE RELIGIONS OF MAN
90-91 (1958)).
153. MAx L. STACKHOUSE, CREEDS, SOCIETY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A STUDY IN THREE
CULTURES 1 (1984) [hereinafter CREEDS]. Michael Perry asserts the proposition in the
form of a question:
Why-in virtue of what [source]-is it the case both that every human being
has inherent dignity and that should we live our lives accordingly, that is, in
a way that respects this dignity?. .. To affirm the morality of human rights
is to affirm the twofold claim that every human being has inherent dignity
and is inviolable.
TOWARD A THEORY, supra note 40, at 5-6.
154. See generally CREEDS, supra note 153, at 10-14.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 13-14.
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the religious concept of truth and to replace it with the less meta-
physical concept of freedom. 1
57
The claim of universality is more hotly challenged than claims
about human dignity or the rule of law. 5' The principal objection,
other than the fact that all attempts to empirically demonstrate
universality have failed,'59 is that human rights are merely a ree-
nactment of nineteenth century cultural imperialism with a secu-
larized Western, liberal, and individualist morality that does not
transcend cultural difference. 6 ' Human rights are simply the
product of the Western Enlightenment and are being imposed on




Opposing the claim of Western dominance is the suggestion
that the great Western powers were initially reluctant to embrace
the human rights regime until pressed to do so by smaller na-
tions, religious groups, and non-governmental organizations. '62
Likewise, it is suggested that human rights standards reflect the
combined input of the entire world, particularly a group of non-
Western philosophers who found that several of the human rights
concepts were so sufficiently widespread to be considered "'impli-
cit in man's nature as a member of society. 1 63 This opposition
does not dispel the notion of Western dominance.
157. Stacy, supra note 36, at 162.
158. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY, supra note 31.
159. Human rights universality has been rejected on the basis of cultural relativism,
although many attempts have been made to defeat the cultural relativists with empirical
evidence. Additional efforts have been made to find a universal "mother notion," such as
"human dignity," and derive specific human rights from that concept. This effort is im-
peded by the failure to produce an empirically verifiable "mother notion" and even by the
failure of cultures to interpret the concept with respect to the specific human rights. Eva
Brems, Reconciling Universality and Diversity in International Human Rights Law, in
HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY, supra note 31, at 213-16.
160. Stacy, supra note 36, at 162.
161. It is virtually undeniable that international human rights reflect eighteenth-
century Enlightenment values incorporated in the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the American Bill of Rights. See Brems, supra note 159, at 224.
162. See Wiktor Osiatynski, On the Universality of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY, supra note 31, at 34-41. Osiatynski notes "that
during the drafting period only Saudi Arabia made a claim that the freedom to marry and
a right to change one's religion were purely Western, rather than universal." Id. at 40.
163. Id. at 40 (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT
AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 226 (2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The UNESCO inquiry is found in HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND
INTERPRETATIONS (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Org., ed., 1949).
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There is, of course, some basis in fact for the claim of Western
dominance, and some commentators take the claim further."
They assert that the core principle of human rights is the concept
of man created in the image of God,'65 and that the Enlighten-
ment merely secularized the concept, and obscuring its true foun-
dation. 166
Some commentators see the UDHR as combining two tradi-
tions. 167 One, the Lockean tradition of rights inherent in the indi-
vidual, focuses on protecting individual autonomy and limiting
government. 6 8 It is reflected in UDHR Articles 16.3 (recognizing
the family as the fundamental group unit of society)' 69 and 26.3
(recognizing the right of parents to choose their child's educa-
tion). 7 ° The other tradition views rights as given by an enligh-
tened state.'7 ' Referred to as a "dignitarian" tradition, it focuses
on providing basic human needs and is reflected in concepts such
as the "free development of personality" seen in UDHR Articles
164. AMESBURY & NEWLANDS, supra note 32, at 29.
165. Shlomo Avineri, The Paradox of Religion and the Universality of Human Rights,
in HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY, supra note 31, at 317-18. Avineri points out that hu-
man rights developed from this tradition, and not Greco-Roman republican classical tradi-
tion, since that tradition developed no concept of rights against the state. Id. at 318. One
wonders at Avineri's statement, "[Wihile modern concepts of citizenship, elections, and
political consent have their origins in the traditions of the Greek polis and the Roman re-
public, this is not the case regarding the question of rights." Id. at 318.
166. See id. at 318. Avineri comments,
Modern historiography. . . is so steeped in the Enlightenment tradition and
the idealization of Greco-Roman republicanism that both sometimes find it
difficult to admit that something as central as the concept of rights against
the state, and the universality of these rights, does not stem from classical
republicanism but from the Judeo-Christian tradition."
Id. at 319. Another commentator observed the irony that the drafters of the UDHR, res-
ponding to the barbarisms of the twentieth century, turned to concepts of human rights
and democracy developed in the Enlightenment for guidance, but it is seldom noted that
such concepts themselves were "rooted in previously established theological assumptions
that derive from antiquity." Max L. Stackhouse, Religion and Human Rights: A Theologi-
cal Apologetic, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS
PERSPECTIVES 485 (John Witte, Jr. & Johann D. Van der Vyver eds., 1996).
167. See, e.g., Osiatynski, supra note 162, at 41.
168. Id.
169. UDHR, supra note 1, at art. 16.3.
170. Id. at art. 26.3.
171. See Osiatynski, supra note 162, at 41. The author notes, "Horst Dippel in his
study of the influence of the American Declaration of Independence in Germany has dem-
onstrated that the concept of the inalienable rights preceding government was simply in-
comprehensible for the majority of educated and enlightened Europeans in the late eigh-
teenth century." Id. at n.24 (citing HORST DIPPEL, GERMANY AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 1770-1800, at 163-67 (Bernhard A. Uhlendorftrans, 1977)).
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22 (rights to social security), 26.2 (rights to education), and 29.1
(duties to community).172
Non-Western themes appear in the human rights regime. The
Third World preference for developmental rights, the Asian and
African emphasis on group rights over individual rights, and the
justification of repressive governments to achieve political stabili-
ty are referred to as the "Southernization" of human rights. 173 Al-
so, indigenous peoples have secured recognition in the positive
human rights regime in various treaties and the 2007 U.N. Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 74
Third World nations assert that claims of universality are in-
consistent with a true respect for diversity. 75 The West is seen as
exporting markets, culture, and human rights that promise free-
dom and prosperity but, in reality, these are deeply exploitative
systems, claiming universality in the name of economic and cul-
tural globalization. 76 Liberal democracy is presented as the sa-
vior and redeemer of cultures that are thousands of years old.17
7
Likewise, claims for religious freedom are seen as an attempt by
Christianity to protect missionary efforts to proselytize the world
and to marginalize non-Western spiritual traditions by prevent-
ing countries, such as China or India, from protecting their spiri-
tual heritages. 71
The Third World wants "the construction of a cross-culturally
legitimate and genuinely universal creed of human dignity" that
172. UDHR, supra note 1, at arts. 22, 26.2, 29.1; Osiatynski, supra note 164, at 42.
173. See Brems, supra note 159, at 216, 218-21.
174. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/G/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
175. Makau Mutua, The Complexity of Universalism in Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS WITH MODESTY, supra note 31, at 56.
176. See id. at 61.
177. Mutua states:
International human rights fall within the historical continuum of the Euro-
pean colonial project in which whites pose as the saviors of a benighted and
savage non-European world. The white human rights zealot joins the unbro-
ken chain that connects her to the colonial administrator, the Bible-wielding
missionary, and the merchant of free enterprise. Salvation in the modern
world is presented as only possible through the holy trinity of human rights,
political democracy, and free markets.
Thus human rights reject the cross-fertilization of cultures and instead
seek the transformation of non-Western cultures by Western cultures.
Id.
178. Id. at 62.
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can reformulate human rights to reflect local cultures. 7 9 The
complexity of these claims is such that some commentators be-
lieve the human rights regime incapable of addressing the crisis
created by economic and cultural globalization. 0
Compounding the problem of universality is that, while human
rights are criticized as Western, the Western intellectual founda-
tions for human rights, such as "enlightened rationalism, reli-
gion-inspired dignity, and secular or religious natural law," have
been eroded, and even reason itself has served as disguised op-
pression, as demonstrated by the Holocaust.' Without meta-
physical foundations, "universalism (and foundations in general)
become problematic."" 2 Further, after undermining the meta-
physical foundations, the modernists' real-world ("materialistic")
foundations reject all non-material foundations ("such as norma-
tive values").' Additionally, the modernists' rational justifica-
tion, which is based on logic, formalism, and direct sense-
experience, is itself seen as an inadequate basis for human
rights. 184
While the philosophical foundation of a shared human identity
seems unsustainable in the face of cultural difference, there are
numerous attempts to provide a sufficient justification for the
human rights regime.185 Some commentators see hope for univer-
sality in the widespread rhetoric of human rights, the political
search for pragmatic solutions, and the use of ethical discourse
through procedures to produce legal and factual equality.' 8 They
179. Id. at 63.
180. Mutua states:
Ruthless, hedonistic, and relentlessly individualistic and deeply exploitative
beliefs and systems have in the last decade been given universal legitimacy
by economic and cultural globalization. The current official human rights
corpus does not have the analytical or normative tools--or even the desire
and gumption-to unpack the complex oppressions which globalization now
wreaks on individuals and communities. Constructed primarily as the moral
guardian of global capitalism and liberal internationalism, the human rights
corpus is simply unable to confront structurally and in a meaningful way the
deep-seated imbalances of power and privilege which bedevil our world.
Id. at 63.
181. Andrds Saj6, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY, supra note 31, at 8.
182. Id. at 10.
183. Richard A. Shweder, Moral Realism Without the Ethnocentrism: Is It Just a List of
Empty Truisms?, in HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY, supra note 31, at 65, 67.
184. Id.
185. See Stacy, supra note 36, at 170-82.
186. See id.
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see a shared feature in the desire to attribute authentic agency to
a claimant and to respond, as much as possible, to "the claimant's
subjectively experienced human rights transgression."18 7 They
propose that "a fuller sense of the world is found in the expanse of
local narratives rather than in a single grand narrative," in the
ethic of alterity that requires committed listening to understand a
different culture, and in a procedure for the operation of this
moral obligation and allowance of "human rights judgments to
evolve in step with political sensibilities." 88 Others see human
rights as the result of a long term historical/theological develop-
ment. 
189
Max L. Stackhouse, a Christian ethicist at Princeton Theologi-
cal Seminary, sees the human rights regime as uniquely Western
and undeniably religious.19 ° He sees it as an "attempt to reclaim a
firm foundation for social ethics" that is widely accepted in the
West because it reflects common roots that go back thousands of
years and are not always acknowledged.1 9' It is the result of a his-
toric development of politics and theology that is a synthesis of
early Christian thought with universalistic categories of Plato,
Aristotle, and the Stoics that produced a public theology in the
thought of St. Augustine in the fourth century. 192 After the fall of
Rome, it was the church that carried on the tradition:
[Tihe Church remained, preserving the universalistic values of both
Greco-Roman and Hebraic belief, without which modern discussion
of human rights would have been impossible.... More importantly,
it preserved a distinction between family, state, and church, sus-
tained by an organized constituency that manifests a continuing
universal concern for all members of humanity, guided by a powerful
sense of duty to a universal moral law.
193
During the Middle Ages, challenges from Islam, the monastic
movement, and the free cities movement tested basic values and
the church's position of primacy over civil authorities. 94 The con-
187. Id. at 179.
188. Id. at 180.
189. CREEDS, supra note 153, at 6-7.
190. Id. at 6-9, 28.
191. Id. at 28.
192. Id. at 38-40.
193. Id. at 39 & n.14 (citing MAX STACKHOUSE, ETHICS AND THE URBAN ETHOs 108-41
(1972)).
194. Id. at 40-44.
1284 [Vol. 43:1255
ESSENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
flict between popes and emperors, 95 epitomized by the Investi-
ture Controversy and the Conciliar Movement, kept alive the
ideal of "a universalistic community which could be a witness for
justice and righteousness without being crushed," and the concept
of a right of resistance to tyrannical authority developed.196 It is
claimed that the issue discussed at the Council of Constance
(1415) was
... an issue which haunts all discussion of human rights: are claims
about universals fundamentally to be decided by an appeal to an ob-
jective order of things, which presumably only some can know with
clarity, or are they to be derived from a consensus formed in dialo-
gue? The former stresses the question of truth, whether all agree or
not; the later stresses procedures whereby people can come to
agreement about the truth. One asks "What is?"; the other asks,
"Who says?"
197
The failure of the Conciliar Movement to establish that univer-
sal moral order eclipsed the ideal of a universal moral order until
the advent of the UDHR.'98 The key to this advent, according to
Stackhouse, was the development in the West of a split between
secular and ecclesiastical authority.'9 9 This split opened a social
space (in which public dialogue could occur and intermediate pri-
vate agencies could develop) that criticized authority with impun-
ity.2"0 Such agencies acted without official governmental authori-
ty, but freely asserted government's responsibility to conform to a
common ethic in dealing with their own citizens, as well as with
foreign governments.20 ' The roots also reflect the biblical concept
of the covenantal relationship, constituting responsibility to God
and the Old Testament tradition that saw prophets in Israel rise
up to challenge the people and government to live by a higher
standard to fulfill their covenantal obligation.2 2
195. These conflicts were not seen as conflicts between church and state, but as con-
flicts between officers of the same society. JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, POLITICAL THOUGHT
FROM GERSON TO GROTIUS: 1414-1625 57 (2d ed. 1916).
196. CREEDS, supra note 153, at 41-42.
197. Id. at 46 (citing OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE vii-xlv
(Frederic William Maitland trans., 1960)).
198. See id. at 26-27.
199. See id. at 27-28.
200. See id. at 28-30.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 33.
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It was during the Reformation period that "Free Church Cal-
vinists" developed covenantal ideas of community, which included
agreements between God and each member of the community,
with responsibility to establish a moral community with institu-
tions of accountability. 0 3 The Calvinist tradition was critiqued by
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill. 204 Hobbes ar-
gued for human rights constructed from human will that freed
man from theological obligations.2 ' Locke rebelled against the re-
ligious strife of Puritan ("Cromwellian") England and sought a
development of natural law from reason and experience with the
recognition of the worth and dignity of all people." 6 Mill argued
that laws should be judged by their ability "to produce pleasure or
inhibit pain."207 The synthesis of these ideas moved Liberals and
Calvinists to value "property, one's body, family, work, the uni-
versity, and religious expression" and produced the cradle in
which human rights could be discussed in the twentieth cen-
tury.08
Building on his description of the religious impact on human
rights development, Stackhouse claims a special role for all reli-
gions to play in the dialogue on human rights, with each bringing
its unique contribution.2 9 To this end, Stackhouse calls on all re-
ligions, and Christianity in particular, to develop a "public theol-
ogy" that can support a universal ethic.210
Non-religious attempts to achieve widespread consensus in di-
verse societies have also been proposed. These include theories
such as "multiplicity of justifications," "overlapping consensus,"
and "incompletely theorized agreements," which will now be dis-
cussed.
203. WILLIAM H. BRACKNEY, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS: THE
CHRISTIAN TRADITION 9-10 (2005).




208. Id. at 10-11.
209. See generally Max L. STACKHOUSE, 4 GOD AND GLOBALIZATION: GLOBALIZATION
AND GRACE (2007).
210. Id. at 77.
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D. Multiplicity of Justifications
Another approach to the question of universality is developed
by Richard Amesbury and George M. Newlands, who propose a
strategy for reconciling universality (at the level of norms) with
particularity (at the level ofjustificatory contexts), using the term
"situated universalism."211 They recognize that universality can
be defined in three ways:212 first, universal can mean that human
rights purport to apply to every person; second, human rights
could be said to apply at all times and in all places; or third, it
could be said that they are universal in that they find sufficiently
widespread acceptance.213
Amesbury and Newlands describe three concepts common in
moral theory.214 First, "moral objectivism," in which moral truths
hold regardless of "whether or not they are endorsed by oneself or
one's community."215 Second, "moral relativism," in which what is
right or wrong is determined by one's culture and will vary from
culture to culture.21 ' Third, "moral constructivism," which seeks a
middle ground, sees morality as a human construct but also be-
lieves moral norms can be universal-but only if they are univer-
sally accepted by all human beings.217
Amesbury and Newlands assert that human rights must be
justified based on the objectivist model because one's human
rights cannot "depend on popular consensus and cannot be re-
voked by popular demand."21 8 They continue by advancing a mid-
dle ground, asserting that what is necessary to support a claim of
universality is a society that supports "a moral tradition from
within which human beings are conceived of in the relevant
way-that is, as possessing dignity qua human beings, rather
than simply by virtue of their participation in a given communi-
ty."219 Starting with a concept of universal human dignity, the
justification for human rights may vary in different communities,
211. AMESBURY & NEWLANDS, supra note 32, at 67.
212. Id. at 64.
213. Id. at 64-65.
214. Id. at 62-63.
215. Id. at 62.
216. Id. at 62-63.
217. Id. at 63.
218. Id. at 72.
219. Id. at 71.
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and the hope is that "members of varying traditions might be able
rationally to affirm one another's mutual dignity and basic rights
as persons. 22 ° While this plurality of justifications may produce
varying ways in which human dignity should be protected, it is
likely that certain rights-prohibition of torture or slavery, for
example-may be protected by wide agreement. 22 1 Further, at
some basic level, human rights are universal in that "no human
being wants to be arbitrarily deprived of life, to be tortured, to be
exploited or despised."222 The challenge may simply be to find the
liberal concepts in every religion and culture.
Amesbury and Newlands's views may produce a minimalist
view of human rights. However, if a multiplicity of justifications
is possible, then religious justifications can be effective even
though they are not universally accepted. Indeed, as they point
out, even advocates of human rights "do not necessarily articulate
the grounds of their conviction in 'specific agreed-upon terms.' 223
E. Overlapping Consensus
Similar minimalist views come from Rawls's theory of overlap-
ping consensus and Sunstein's theory of incompletely theorized
agreements. 24 Rawls, building on his landmark book, A Theory of
Justice, with its concept of "justice as fairness," asks the question,
"[Hiow is it possible that there can be a stable and just society
whose free and equal citizens are deeply divided by conflicting
and even incommensurable religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines?"
225
In Theory of Justice, Rawls uses the social contract theory to
oppose utilitarianism, rejecting the idea that people seeing them-
selves as equals "would agree to a principle which may require
lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater sum
220. Id. at 76.
221. Id.
222. Guy Haarscher, Can Human Rights Be "Contextualized"?, in HUMAN RIGHTS WITH
MODESTY, supra note 31, at 120.
223. AMESBURY & NEWLANDS, supra note 32, at 75.
224. See JOHN RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (2005) [hereinafter POLITICAL
LIBERALISM]. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108
HARv. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
225. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 224, at 133.
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of advantages enjoyed by others."226 To develop his "justice as
fairness" theory, Rawls relies on a hypothetical starting point at
which society enters into a social contract.227 He posits a group of
rational, unenvious, and disinterested persons that are meeting
to decide the basic structure upon which the society will allocate
basic rights and duties.22' Thus, in deciding the principles of so-
cial justice, there is an element of rational choice by the partici-
pants. The participants, in this hypothetical past, operate under a
"veil of ignorance," not knowing the place they might occupy in
the society that will be governed under the principles chosen.229
Justice as fairness posits two principles, plus a corollary, that
are arrived at through procedural justice. The principles are,
first, that each person will have maximum feasible liberty, and
second, that social and economic inequalities are just only if they
benefit the least advantaged members of society.2 0 The first prin-
ciple is aimed at primary social goods, such as the basic rights of
freedom to participate in the political process, freedom of speech
and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, the
right to property, freedom to choose one's occupation, and the
freedom from arrest.231 The second principle, the "difference prin-
ciple," distributes the primary social goods of wealth, income,
power, and authority so as to work to the advantage of the least
privileged in society and to attach them to offices and positions
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.232
226. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12-15 (1971) [hereinafter THEORY OF
JUSTICE].
227. Id. at 12.
228. See id. at 11.
229. Id. at 12. Rawls asserts:
[N]o one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor
does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abili-
ties, his intelligence, strength, and the like .... The principles of justice are
chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or
disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or
the contingency of social circumstances .... The original position is ... ap-
propriate... and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair.
Id.
230. HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID HOLDCROFT, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXTS AND COMMENTARY
279 (1991).
231. Id.
232. Id. Rawls develops five constraints on the principles: They must be general and
able to serve a well ordered society in perpetuity; they must be universal in that they ap-
ply to everyone by virtue of their being moral persons; they must be publishable; they
must be adjudicative; and they must be final. Id. at 278-79. Rawls suggests that:
The main idea is that a person's good is determined by what is for him the
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Rawls adds self-respect to the list of primary social goods, ar-
guing that it is intuitively included, because without it nothing
would seem worth doing.233 Rawls's inclusion of self-respect pro-
vides a basis to further his analysis, just as human dignity sup-
ports the human rights regime without any specific definition.
Rawls describes these primary social goods as "thin" because
they represent the minimal definition of social goods that all men
acting behind the veil of ignorance would want. 34 Rawls's prima-
ry assumption is that people in the original position would con-
sider the worst-off positions in each condition presented and,
supposing that each person would want more rather than less of
the goods in question, rank the alternatives to maximize primary
goods in the minimal positions, for example, "maximinning."
235
On balance, however, Rawls's principles of justice as fairness
rest first on the reasoning process of the original position and,
second, on strongly held intuitions about justice.236 In other
words, "[w]hat Rawls has done is to show that the conditions of
the original position will lead to two principles of justice that we
already intuitively accept., 237 Justice as fairness leaves an impor-
tant question inadequately answered. That question is how a so-
ciety based on justice as fairness could be a stable society. The
most rational long-term plan of life given reasonably favorable circumstances.
A man is happy when he is more or less successfully in the way of carrying
out his plan. To put it briefly, the good is the satisfaction of rational desire.
• . .Given the alternatives available, a rational plan is one which cannot be
improved upon; there is no other plan which, taking everything into account,
would be preferable.
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 226, at 92-93.
233. Id. at 178.
234. See id. at 376-77. By self-respect, Rawls's means having a sense of the value of
one's plan in life and having confidence in one's ability to carry it out. Id. at 178. He as-
sumes three types of facts about human nature: There are broad features of human de-
sires and need; plans must fit the requirements of human capacities and abilities; and the
Aristotelian Principle that, all things being equal, humans prefer more complex activities
to less complex activities. Rawls believes these facts about human needs and abilities are
so clear he that common sense knowledge suffices for purposes of his analysis. Id. at 425-
26.
235. See id. at 152-53, 396-97.
236. DAVIES & HOLDCROFT, supra note 230, at 291.
237. Id. This is Rawls's concept of "reflective equilibrium" which, along with his belief
that the principles would be arrived at freely under the original position, and his concept
of "philosophical reflection" in which Kant's autonomous agent unhampered by particular
desires, reflects on the situation and applies the principles to everyone would arrive at
these two principles. Liberty and freedom in modern thought are external matters and the
internal world is left to itself as though all things internal are ordered by the external sit-
uation.
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answer is Rawls's concept of overlapping consensus which he de-
velops in Political Liberalism."23
To understand overlapping consensus, Rawls points to the Re-
formation, in which Catholics and Protestants, both of whom had
a concept of the "good," rested their views of God and society on
either the Church or the Bible-their views did not admit to com-
promise.239 Opposing "comprehensive doctrines" can support a
constitutional democratic regime, and can occur only when the
parties are forced by circumstances, exhaustion, or by equal liber-
ty of conscience and freedom of thought.24 ° The former leads to a
modus vivendi (agree to disagree), while the latter may lead to
the more hopeful possibilities of a constitution and an eventual
overlapping consensus. 241 The overlapping consensus answers the
question, "[W]hether in the circumstances of a plurality of rea-
sonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, liberal and
nonliberal, a well-ordered and stable democratic government is
possible, and indeed even how it is to be conceived as coherent."
242
Rawls's Theory of Justice sought to reignite interest on a higher
plane of the traditional social contract doctrine as part of a moral
philosophy without distinguishing between moral and political
philosophy.243 But moral and political distinctions are important
because without them, justice as fairness suffers a serious inter-
nal problem of suggesting that it is accepted by society as part of
a "comprehensive philosophical doctrine."244 This being an unrea-
listic assumption, social stability is undermined in a society built
on a plurality of comprehensive and incompatible, yet reasonable,
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. However, Rawls
came to realize that in a world filled with incompatible compre-
hensive doctrines, justice as fairness could not be included as one
such doctrine.245 Political liberalism supposes that reasonable
238. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 224, at xxix.
239. Id. at xxxviii-xxxix.
240. Id. at xxix.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at xv.
244. Id. at xv-xvi.
245. See id. at xvi. Unreasonable and irrational comprehensive doctrines are contained
so they do not undermine the unity and justice of society. Rawls further asserts:
A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a plural-
ism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these
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comprehensive doctrines would not reject the essentials of a dem-
ocratic regime, and permits Rawls to move from a simple to a
"reasonable" pluralism and to an idea of a political conception of
justice and of overlapping consensus and public reason, rather
than a comprehensive doctrine.246
While the so-called "Enlightenment project" sought a compre-
hensive philosophical secular doctrine to replace religious author-
ity based on the foundering Christian faith, Rawls does not see
the need for comprehensive doctrines.247 Rawls's problem was to
work out a concept of political justice for a constitutional demo-
cratic regime that the plurality of reasonable doctrines that cha-
racterize a free democratic regime would endorse.24 The result is
that the citizen, in ideal overlapping conceptions, affirms both a
comprehensive doctrine as well as the local political conception
that is somehow related and is considered "reasonable," rather
than "true," or practical rather than theoretical.249
Referring again to the Reformation, Rawls notes that moral
and political philosophy began when religions were pitted against
one another in the Reformation. ° This plurality of Christian re-
ligions eventually led to a working-out of tolerance and religious
doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally .... Political liberalism assumes
that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible com-
prehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason
within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic
regime. Political liberalism also supposes that a reasonable comprehensive
doctrine does not reject the essentials of a democratic regime.
Id.
246. Rawls states the problem another way:
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of
free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines? Put another way: How is it
possible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may
live together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime?
What is the structure and content of a political conception that can gain the




249. Id. at xix-xx. Conceptions of the good and of persons as free and equal must be
appropriately political and distinct from the comprehensive views. Thus the search is for
these reasonable public justifications on fundamental political questions. The political
conception of justice is referred to as "reasonable" rather than "true" so that a limited con-
cept is proposed and the proposal is one of practical reason rather than theoretical reason.
Id. atxx.
250. See id. at xxii.
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liberty, as well as a limiting of the power of the newly developing
central state.25' Over time, a process began which answered the
question of how it would be possible to maintain "a stable and
just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by rea-
sonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines."252 The
problem is one of politics and not of the definition of good, since
that definition comes within each of the reasonable pluralistic re-
ligions.253
By the eighteenth century, writers were seeking a basis for
moral knowledge independent of ecclesiastical authority and
available to the ordinary, reasonable, and conscientious person.254
On the nature of moral knowledge, Kant and Hume found it in
some way in human nature.255 Rawls looks at Kant and Hume as
expressing a comprehensive liberalism and not the political libe-
ralism that he propounds-although he may come to the same
conclusion about human nature.256 Political liberalism's view of
justice deals with basic rights such as religious and political liber-
ties, including freedom of movement, fair and equal opportunity,
the right of personal property, the protections of the rule of law,
and the justice of social and economic inequalities in a society in
which citizens are viewed as free and equal.257 While family and
gender issues are not addressed, Rawls feels that they can be ex-
plained within the framework and principles of justice as fair-
ness.
258
Rawls has merely adjusted his concept of justice as fairness for
the fact of reasonable pluralism, meaning a plurality of reasona-
ble comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines,
251. See id. at xxiv.
252. Id. at xxv.
253. See id.
254. Id. at xxvi.
255. Id. at xxvii. Rawls asserts that Hume and Kant in their own way suggested:
[T]he moral order arises in some way from human nature itself, as reason or
as feeling, and from the conditions of our life in society. They also believe that
the knowledge or awareness of how we are to act is directly accessible to
every person who is normally reasonable and conscientious. And finally, they
believe that we are so constituted that we have in our nature sufficient mo-
tives to lead us to act as we ought without the need of external sanctions, at
least in the form of rewards and punishments imposed by God or the state.
Id.
256. See id.
257. Id. at xxviii.
258. See id. at xxix.
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which is the "normal condition" of a democratic culture given its
free institutions.259 Justice as fairness is not a comprehensive doc-
trine but a social contract that is the best approximation of our
judgments about justice, and thus gives the most appropriate
moral basis for a democratic society.26 ° The reasonable conception
must accept the political solution as part of a reasonable overlap-
ping consensus. 261' Because the "religious good of salvation" can-
not be the overriding purpose of a democratic society of reasona-
ble pluralism, concepts of liberty and equality can provide the
means for citizens to carry out and effectively use their freedoms
for their own purposes.262 Political liberalism argues that society
is stable because:
the laws of nature and human psychology would lead citizens who
grow up as members of that well-ordered society to acquire a sense of
justice sufficiently strong to uphold their political and social institu-
tions over generations.... As always, stability.., for the right rea-
sons ... implies that the reasons from which citizens act include
those given by the account of justice they affirm... which characte-
rizes their effective sense of justice. 263
Justice is fairness reformulated as a free-standing political
conception of justice, not derived from any comprehensive doc-
trine, in which citizens are reasonable and are willing to offer
others free and equal treatment, even at their own expense. This
is the criterion of reciprocity under which "our exercise of political
power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons
we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by
other citizens as a justification of those actions."264 Moral auton-
omy, for example, may be part of a comprehensive doctrine, but
cannot be part of a political doctrine because it is rejected by
many religious comprehensive doctrines.265
A "reasonable overlapping consensus" comes about by formulat-
ing a freestanding political conception having its own intrinsic po-
litical ideal as expressed by the criterion of reciprocity. 266 In this
way, reasonable comprehensive doctrines can endorse political
259. Id. at xxxvi n.3.
260. See id. at xxxvi-xxxvii.
261. Id. at xxxvii-xxviii.
262. Id. at xxxix.
263. Id. at xl.
264. Id. at xliv.
265. See id. at xliii.
266. See id. at xlv.
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conceptions for the right reasons and become part of a reasonable
overlapping consensus. The political conception will define cer-
tain basic rights, prioritize them, and provide the means to effec-
tively use them by the citizens.267 The idea of public reason is that
citizens are to conduct their public political discussions of constitu-
tional essentials and matters of basic justice within the framework of
what each sincerely regards as a reasonable political conception of
justice, a conception that expresses political values that others as
free and equal also might reasonably be expected reasonably to en-
dorse.
26 8
Citizens are to follow the principle of reciprocity in applying
public reasons to questions of constitutional essentials and mat-
ters of basic justice.269 On questions in which there is a standoff,
the outcome will be determined by a vote; in exercising the vote,
the outcome will be seen as reasonable provided "all citizens of a
reasonably just constitutional regime sincerely vote in accordance
with the idea of public reason."27 ° The losing party will continue
to assert its non-public reasons, but will do so within the context
of acceptance of the reasonably determined public result.
The criterion for stability with liberty includes institutions
such as the following: public financing of elections; fair equality of
opportunity in education and training; a decent distribution of in-
come and wealth; a societal employer of last resort; and basic
healthcare for all citizens.271 Stability also requires that "people
who grow up under just institutions (as the political conception
defines them) acquire a normally sufficient sense of justice so
that they generally comply with those institutions." '272
267. Id. at xlvi.
268. Id. at xlviii (footnotes omitted). Rawls takes a wide view of public reason, suggest-
ing that "reasonable [comprehensive] doctrines may be introduced in public reason at any
time, provided that in due course public reasons, given by a reasonable political concep-
tion, are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are intro-
duced to support." Id. at xlix-1. Rawls states:
The criterion of reciprocity is normally violated whenever basic liberties are
denied. For what reasons can both satisfy the criterion of reciprocity and jus-
tify denying to some persons religious liberty, holding others as slaves, im-
posing a property qualification on the right to vote, or denying the right of
suffrage to women?
Id. at 447.
269. See id. at xliv.
270. Id. at liv.
271. Id. at lvi-lvii.
272. Id. at 141.
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Thus, the overlapping consensus is not a compromise, but a po-
sition held, and supported by plurality of reasonable comprehen-
sive and conflicting doctrines, that inevitably exists in a demo-
cratic society. Rawls sees justice as fairness, making possible an
overlapping consensus that completes and expands the movement
that began three centuries ago with the "gradual acceptance of
the principle of toleration and led to the nonconfessional state
and equal liberty of conscience."273
F. Incompletely Theorized Agreements
Cass Sunstein approaches the problem of social pluralism in a
democratic society, recognizing Rawls's concept of "overlapping
consensus" of reasonable people but suggesting that such a con-
cept is impractical because democracies are populated with
people who have strong disagreements and distrust abstract
theories altogether.274 Sunstein looks to the judiciary, where disa-
greements must be resolved under considerable time constraints,
and where the result is required to set precedent for solving fu-
ture conflicts.275 In this setting, the "well-functioning legal sys-
tems" tend to adopt a special strategy to produce agreement
which Sunstein calls "incompletely theorized agreements on par-
ticular outcomes."276 As Sunstein defines the term: "They agree on
the result and on relatively narrow or low-level explanations for
it. They need not agree on fundamental principle."277 He sees this
as a way for diverse people to show mutual respect while simul-
taneously promoting social stability.27
Sunstein cites examples where the law can reach a result that
is agreed upon by various groups for different reasons.279 These
examples include protection of endangered species, strict liability
in tort cases, and protection of labor unions from employer coer-
cion."' Resolving conflict is the normal activity of the law, which
makes the law well-suited for such a coalition. In each case, it
273. Id. at 154.
274. Sunstein, supra note 224, at 1734-35.
275. Id. at 1749.
276. Id. at 1735.
277. Id. at 1735-36.
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may be necessary for judges to offer an opinion or rationale, on a
low-level or middle-level principle, and the result is an incom-
pletely theorized agreement.28" '
People often reach incompletely theorized agreements on gen-
eral principles but disagree on the specific application. 22 They
may agree that racial discrimination is wrong, but disagree on af-
firmative action.283 A second type of incompletely theorized
agreement is the mid-level agreement on principle, such as a be-
lief that the government cannot discriminate on the basis of race,
but disagreement on the overall theory or on the lower-level ques-
tion of affirmative action.2' A third type of incompletely theorized
agreement occurs when people agree on the outcome and on some
low-level principle to support it, but cannot agree on more ab-
stract principles.2 5
It is the third type of incompletely theorized agreement that is
important in formulating legal rules. "A key social function of
rules is to allow people to agree on the meaning, authority, and
even the soundness of a governing legal provision in the face of
disagreements about much else."" 6 Sunstein expresses concern
281. Id. at 1737.
282. Id. at 1739.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 1740. A second example is that of abortion. Sunstein asserts that vari-
ous reasons might be given to support the result of allowing the incompletely theorized
agreement:
There is a political point as well .... Diverse judges may agree that Roe v.
Wade should not be overruled, though the reasons that lead each of them to
that conclusion sharply diverge. Perhaps the judges have different large-scale
theories and can agree only on a low-level principle. Perhaps some of the
judges have not developed ambitious accounts of the relevant area of the law
at all. Thus some people emphasize that the Court should respect its own
precedents; others think that Roe was rightly decided as a way of protecting
women's equality; others think that the case was rightly decided as a way of
protecting privacy; others think that the case has everything to do with state
neutrality toward religion; others think that restrictions on abortion are un-
likely to protect fetuses, and so the case rightly reflects the fact that any reg-
ulation of abortion would be ineffective in promoting its own purposes. We
can find incompletely theorized political agreements on particular outcomes
in many areas of law and politics-on both sides of the affirmative action con-
troversy, both sides of the dispute over the death penalty, and in all facets of
the debate over health care reform.
Id. at 1742-43.
286. Id. at 1741.
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over efforts to provide overly comprehensive reasons for a given
decision.87
Incompletely theorized agreements are seen as "promot[ing]
two goals of liberal democracy and a liberal legal system."288 First,
these agreements enable people to live together and, second, they
permits people to show each other a measure of reciprocity and
mutual respect. 289 For example, Sunstein believes mutual respect
is enhanced if judges reaffirming Roe v. Wade would do so "with-
out challenging the belief that the fetus is a human being."
290
Thus, incompletely theorized agreements are often necessary
when a simple, general theory cannot adequately address the var-
ious values at stake in the debate. 291 They reduce the cost of en-
during disagreements (losers do not lose their entire theory); they
promote moral evolution; they represent the best approach when
time and capacity is limited (e.g. by the use of precedents); and
they are well adapted to a system that views precedents as fixed
points.292
For judicial decisions, reluctance to set down overly ambitious
reasons can lead to both over- or under-inclusive rules and con-
flicts with other precedents.293
Ronald Dworkin objects to the incompletely theorized agree-
ments approach, preferring to assert a high degree of theorization
and a more self-conscious adjudication.294 Interpreting law should
be considered an effort to make law "'the best it can be,"' consis-
tent with Dworkin's concept of law as integrity.29 5 Sunstein re-
jects this approach as impractical given the time constraints on
judicial decision-making and in a pluralistic society where judges
have differing values.296 Sunstein also sees Dworkin's concept of
integrity as an inadequate, court-centered justification of law,
whereas in a democratic regime, the theory of authority is con-
287. See id. at 1742.
288. Id. at 1746.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1747.
291. See id. at 1748.
292. Id. at 1748-50.
293. Id. at 1755.
294. Id. at 1757.
295. Id. (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 229 (1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
296. Id. at 1758-59.
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strained by democratic considerations.29 Sunstein sees develop-
ment of large-scale theories as a more democratic task than a
judicial one, and thus Sunstein's incompletely theorized agree-
ments are more broadly suited for this diverse task than Dwor-
kin's law as integrity.298
Finally, Sunstein admits that his approach is partial and that,
when appropriate, a large-scale theory might be preferable.299
Nevertheless, through incompletely theorized agreements, the
door sometimes opens into areas that would otherwise have been
left undiscovered. °0 Disagreements may have value, and incom-
pletely theorized agreements may be mistaken.'' However, for
Sunstein, if everyone having a reasonable view finds agreement
on a judgment, then "nothing is amiss."302 Nevertheless, judg-
ments need to be scrutinized over time to correct mistaken out-
comes.
303
Sunstein concludes that judicial reasoning should be presump-
tively narrow and consistent with incompletely theorized agree-
ments, but no such presumption should apply outside the judi-
ciary.30 4 The only general theory that Sunstein suggests for
everyone is the theory of incompletely theorized agreements,
which usually is accepted within the constrictions of another gen-
eral theory. 5 While people may disagree with Sunstein's theory,
he concludes with the observation that, in practice, it is followed
on a wide scale.0 6
297. Id. at 1763.
298. See id.
299. Id. at 1764.
300. See id. at 1740-41.
301. Id. at 1764.
302. Id. at 1769.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1771.
305. Id. at 1771-72.
306. Id. at 1772.
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G. Third World Objections
The Third World's plea for dialogue 3 7 and the accommodation
of human rights to local conditions, which occurs when universa-
listic aspirations conflict with local conditions, may be answered
with a multiplicity of justifications, overlapping consensus, or in-
completely theorized agreements. 3° Local resistance to the impo-
sition of a "universal" value may come from political elites seek-
ing to maintain their grip on society, 30 9 but it may also come from
the local population seeking to protect a conflicting local cultural
value.310 When resistance comes from both constituencies, the im-
position of the "universal" value may be viewed as either intole-
rant or paternalistic.3 1'
Even as'suming that the imposition of human rights is paterna-
listic, local circumstances may demand that limitations be placed
on the application of particular rights.312 These limitations may
307. Critics believe that a truly genuine dialogue between advocates of human rights
and the Third World is necessary to formulate a universal human rights regime. See Mu-
tua, supra note 175, at 56. It is not possible to construct a post liberal world by freezing
liberalism. Id. at 57.
308. In a given situation, cultural particularism may demand that the human rights
norms be adapted to the culture, and, in others, the cultural norm should be adapted to
the human rights norm, Brems, supra note 159, at 227. Determining which should adapt
may depend on who is calling for the adaption, what specific right is being adapted, and
the impact of making the adaption. Id. at 227-28.
309. Wojciech Sadurski, Universalism, Localism and Paternalism in Human Rights
Discourse, in HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY, supra note 31, at 143 (noting that "'Asian
values'" can be viewed as "part of the legitimation strategy of authoritarian regimes").
310. See, e.g., Richard Shweder, Moral Realism Without the Ethnocentrism: Is It Just a
List of Empty Truisms?, in HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY, supra note 31, at 65, 77 (dis-
cussing female genital mutilation in Africa).
311. Intolerance is "an interference with other people's behavior based on our moral
disagreement with their values" whereas paternalism is "an interference with other
people's behavior on the basis that their values, when pursued, are (in the opinion of the
interferer) harmful to them, and that the overall consequences of the interference will be
to their benefit." Sadurski, supra note 309, at 145-46. In general, human rights imposition
is paternalistic, in that the interferer sees the result as beneficial for the person, and not
intolerant, where the benefit is seen as irrelevant. Id. at 146.
312. Take, for example, the imposition of "gender equality" on a Muslim society in
which women in the society resist such an imposition. Id. at 146. Is the resistance the re-
sult of ignorance, fear, or satisfaction with the existing order? Id. at 146-47. Should the
position of men in the society be considered? Id. at 147-48. Are there limits on the imposi-
tion of universalism in this and similar cases? Sadurski's proposal is:
... [11n the very structure of human rights there are some clear limits to the
feasibility of universalism: not because of any "external" reasons, such as our
possible concern about tolerance and avoidance of arrogance, but rather for
"internal" reasons-because, at a certain point, universalism ceases to make
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be necessary to justify the rights rationally or empirically. For
example, the right not to be discriminated against is justified by
identifying a "non-discriminatory classification" that may be for-
mulated differently from community to community depending on
differing factors within each community.313 A second example is
that freedom of expression may be limited when used to justify
outrageous speech, such as Holocaust denial speech, which is of-
ten "anti-Semitism masquerading as a historical theory."31 Such
speech may be restricted in Germany, where it threatens demo-
cratic stability, while it may be tolerated in the United States,
where no state interest would be undermined. 1 Thus, empirical
factors may determine whether a restriction is justified.316
H. Human Rights as a New Religion
Political theorists have long sought a formula for the estab-
lishment of civil government." 7 Hobbes, for example, envisions an
good moral sense. "At a certain point" is a crucial proviso ...
Id. at 149.
313. Id. at 149-50. Sadurski thoroughly develops this argument using three criteria,
which require consideration of a local factual situation. See id. at 152-54.
314. Id. at 158.
315. Id. at 157-58.
316. This does not mean
that we should not be universalistic in our human rights aspirations; rather,
... to a certain degree, we cannot be so. There is a point at which it is neces-
sary to blend ... some local justificatory or empirical factors with universal
human rights, and the results will be different in different societies. One and
the same right will manifest differently in different societies, or its concrete
articulation will or will not be justified in different societies, or its institu-
tional articulation will have to take different forms.
Id. 149. Sadurski further notes:
Perhaps the most important "universal" human right is the right not to be
discriminated against: a right to equality. It is tempting to say that criteria of
"discrimination" differ from culture to culture but this would be glib-to state
that there is a right not to be discriminated against and then suggest that the
criteria of discrimination are supplied by local cultures would be to render
the whole principle of non-discrimination meaningless.
Id. at 149-50. To satisfy the criteria of non-discrimination, Sadurski uses Rawls's "reflec-
tive equilibrium," under which criteria for intuitively known discrimination (e.g. refusing
voting rights for women) is applied to the alleged discrimination (e.g., banning of women
in combat) to determine whether the discrimination is also banned. Id. at 152 (citing
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 226, at 20). Sadurski uses three criteria of contempt, in-
cluding whether the legislation adds to existing burdens; whether it involves imposition of
burdens by those who are not under the burden; and whether the burden stigmatizes the
bearer. Id. at 152-53. While these may be acceptable criteria, they are not "universal" but
are dependent on the "local" factual situation. Id. at 153.
317. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651), reprinted in LEVIATHAN 5 (Richard
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agreement bringing men out of the violence of nature to assemble
together for protection and order.318 Others, such as Rousseau,
suggest a social contract bringing men out of natural happiness
(freedom) into social bondage. 319 These are speculations about a
hypothetical and non-existent past. In fact, as Locke recognized,
man was never free in the sense that he was not under obligation
to God and his neighbor.32 ° Man was born into civil obligations in
the same manner that he is born into filial obligations. But in
that there is a formal equality; each thinker begins their myth
with an assumption of the original and "essential individuality" of
the human race.32" '
Speculating on a "common" beginning point creates a founda-
tion upon which to compare the proposed solution and justifies a
claim that the solution is universal. The human rights regime has
a common starting point in man's inhumanity to man, as wit-
nessed by the inhumanity of the German people towards the Jews
and other minority peoples during the World War II. This inhu-
manity was particularly egregious because Germany had the ad-
vantage of being among the best educated, most civilized, and
highly enlightened nations in the world. Since man's inhumanity
to man can be observed to some degree in the actions of all na-
tions, it can be said that this beginning is universal.
From this beginning one could establish a new religion, and the
facts surrounding the development of the UDHR form a perfect
core. First, we have an intense tragedy-the Holocaust-that
gives birth to a new regime-the United Nations. The new regime
births the new universal principle of the protection of human
rights. The universal principle is based on a universal concept:
the "inherent dignity" and "equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family." '322 The instrument of fulfillment of
E. Flathman & David Johnston eds., 1997); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT (1690), reprinted in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 17
(Paul E. Sigmund ed., 2005); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON SOCIAL CONTRACT OR
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (1762), reprinted in ROUSSEAU'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 84
(Alan Ritter & Julian Conaway Bondanella eds., Julie Conway Bondanella trans., 1988).
318. See HOBBES, supra note 317, 72-73.
319. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 317, at 92-93.
320. See LOCKE, supra note 317, at 19.
321. William T. Cavanaugh, The City: Beyond Secular Parodies, in JOHN MILBANK,
CATHERINE PINKSTOCK & GRAHAM WARD, RADICAL ORTHODOXY: A NEW THEOLOGY 186
(1999).
322. UDHR, supra note 1, at pmbl.
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the universal concept is the rule of law, which is spread by means
of the creation of a universal educational system.3  Finally, there
is the eschatological hope-the building of a foundation for free-
dom, justice, and peace in the world, and the avoidance of the
need to resort to "rebellion against tyranny and oppression."324
Human rights, of course, go further than most religions and
call for legal, political, and moral support from government.325 In-
itially, the UDHR did not provide enforcement, but relied on its
strong emphasis that education should be directed toward
"strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms."326 Human rights became enforceable through the two
Universal Covenants adopted in 1966, as well as under specia-
lized and regional conventions that are binding as treaty law.
327
Indeed, human rights generally override religious claims and re-
quire the "legal fiat of the nation-states or groups of states."328
Convinced of the efficacy of this new formula, advocates of human
rights call on the religions of the world to search their doctrines
and principles to find areas that can be used to support the new
human rights regime.
When addressing the relationship between religions and hu-
man rights, it is important to recognize that both sides of the re-
323. The proclamation itself has a religious character in that it advocates standards of
"right conduct" for all peoples and a commitment to keeping the declaration constantly in
mind and to strive through education to promote and obtain observance by all peoples. Id.
324. Id.
325. Stacy, supra note 36, at 161-62.
326. Osiatynski, supra note 162, at 45-46 (citing UDHR, supra note 1, at art. 26.2).
Osiatynski distinguishes (1) individual rights, which were conceived by philosophers, flow
from contract, and protect individual autonomy, and (2) human rights, which are based on
dignity and are written by politicians. Id. Human rights are "inherent rather than in-
alienable." Id. at 47. Accordingly, human rights protect against rebellion rather than ty-
ranny and create duties that individuals have toward others and society, thereby creating
a new role for the state. Id. Further, the right of rebellion against tyranny is not recog-
nized (as used by Morney in Vindiciae and Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence),
but deals with state sovereignty as the basic principle. Id. at 48. Osiatynski states that the
twentieth-century concept of human rights "accepts the principle of state sovereignty over
its citizens and the resulting international relevance of human rights. Human rights form
a code of conduct for states and imply that when a given state violates this code, other
states will exert pressure to bring the perpetrators to order." Id. at 48.
327. Haarscher, supra note 222, at 104. It is important to see human rights as legally
enforceable rights, and in that regard, the European Court of Human Rights is considered
the "most efficient guarantor" of those rights. Id. at 118. Even that court distorts the word
"tolerance'" by using it to refer to "respect of values and collective practices" rather than
"individual liberty." Id. (citing Guy Haarscher, Tolerance of the Intolerant?, 10 RATIO
JURIS 236-46 (1997)).
328. Stacy, supra note 36, at 179.
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lationship claim universal values. Thus, the challenge is to har-
monize the provisions of religion with the goals of human rights.
With Christianity, this harmonization is not as difficult as with
other religions, because much of the human rights regime is the
result of state/religious conflict over the past 1,000 years. The
Muslim belief, on the other hand, sees no state/religion conflict
and is thus more difficult to harmonize.329 In regards to Judaism,
a centuries-old religion/ethnicity, it has only recently emerged in
the form of a state. 330 Nevertheless, these three religions share
much of a common heritage and will be discussed in this article.
But to understand the interaction of the human rights regime
with these religions, it is important to appreciate the common re-
ligious heritage and history as well as the historic development
that led to freedom of religion.
IV. A RELIGIOUS CRITIQUE
The foregoing discussion demonstrates an effort to ground hu-
man rights in a secular structure, free from religious foundations,
under the belief that recognition of religious foundations would
render the human rights norms unacceptable to other religions. 33
1
But religion has been the glue holding the state together, and one
wonders whether "a democratic government [can] be maintained
without the support of a commonly acknowledged religious value
system?"332 One is hard-pressed to find a viable society in history
that has not had such a value system.333 Someone reflecting on
329. See Avineri, supra note 165, at 322-23.
330. See BRIAN OREND, HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPT AND CONTEXT 225-26 (2002) (dis-
cussing the human rights predicament of Israel); Richard W.J. Clarke, Voices from the
Margins: Knowledge and Interpretation in Israeli Human Rights Protests, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 118 (Richard Ashby Wilson & Jon P. Mitchell eds., 2003)
(discussing the human rights implications of the Arab-Israeli conflict).
331. CREEDS, supra note 153, at 8-9.
332. Gordon Butler, Cometh the Revolution: The Case for Overruling McCollum v.
Board of Education, 99 DICK. L. REV. 843, 853 (1995).
333. Max Stackhouse of Princeton University notes, "No enduring society ... has de-
veloped without a dominant religion at its core, and it is unlikely that a globalized civiliza-
tion, or the structures of civil society likely to populate it, can develop in creative direc-
tions without one either." MAX L. STACKHOUSE, General Introduction to 1 GOD AND
GLOBALIZATION: RELIGION AND THE POWERS OF THE COMMON LIFE 52 (Max L. Stackhouse
& Peter J. Paris eds., 2000). The categories set out allow society to be viewed through a
matrix of values that "allow human life to flourish and constrain tendencies to chaos or
exploitation." STACKHOUSE,. 4 GOD AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 209, at 40-41 & n.5.
Stackhouse further states that "Iraany believe either that modem civilization is imploding
sexually, economically, politically and culturally, due to globalization; others, including
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the prosperity and freedom in the secular states of Europe and
North America can easily overlook the fact that the common
ground in both situations has been Christian and European.334
Modern human rights commentators develop the history of
rights theory from Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Mill
and others, without looking at the deeper roots of freedom that
preceded these thinkers. As already mentioned, the Enlighten-
ment effort to free man from external standards such as the Bible
has left man devoid of any standards, except the goal to achieve
freedom, since truth is relative and cannot form a standard of
conduct. 35 The point is, by 1650 Reformation theology had formed
the political and moral norms upon which the Enlightenment
could build the modern state.336 In fact, few new governmental
principles were added by Enlightenment thinkers other than to
"secularize" the language of what had been developed from scrip-
tural sources.337
To mention a few historical developments prior to 1650 will
suffice. The seminal event in the separation of sacred and secular
authorities338 is the Investiture Controversy of 1076, in which the
the authors of this series, see the prospect of a larger vision in it, one that could, under
certain conditions reconstruct the common life." Id. at 45.
334. CREEDS, supra note 153, at 51-53. In rough numbers, the population of the planet
is 6 billion people, of which 2 billion are Christians, 1 billion are Muslims, and 15 million
are Jews. Of the 2 billion Christians 1 billion are Roman Catholic, 300 million are Protes-
tant, 200 million are Orthodox, and the rest various Christian sects. The other 3 billion
people include 830 million Hindu, 340 million Buddhist, and 96 million Native religions.
See CIA: The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/ xx.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
335. WILLISTON WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 482 (3d ed. 1970)
(1918).
336. See id. at 425-30.
337. See id. at 479-80; HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 202-03 (1983).
338. Jesus's well-known statement, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's
and to God the things that are God's," Matthew 22:21, is been largely responsible for the
separation of spiritual and sacred realms in Western Christianity. This saying is reflected
in the writings of Augustine in the fifth century, in the Roman Catholic doctrine of the two
swords, in Luther's two kingdom view, and most importantly in the separation of church
and state reflected in the U. S. Constitution. Berman attributes the original doctrine to
Pope Gelasius I, who, in the fifth century had written to the emperor Anastasius:
Two [swords] there are, august emperor, by which this world is chiefly ruled,
the sacred authority of the priesthood and the royal power .... If the bishops
themselves, recognizing that the imperial office was conferred on you by di-
vine disposition, obey your laws so far as the sphere of public order is con-
cerned... with what zeal, I ask you, ought you to obey those who have been
charged with administering the sacred mysteries [in matters of religion]?
BERMAN, supra note 337, at 92.
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Roman Catholic Church asserted its independence from secular
authorities and claimed the exclusive right to control all eccle-
siastical appointments. 339 Because the Church also asserted au-
thority over the civil authorities, a struggle ensued that lasted
until the Reformation.340 The Investiture Controversy created a
corporate institution separate and apart from the civil authori-
ties. 341 It was to this "centralized ecclesiastical government to
which every person had the right of appeal beyond feudal authori-
ty, regional ruler, disobedient clergy, and civic order.'342 The con-
troversy created a civil space which, over the long term, allowed
organizations to develop free of civil or ecclesiastical control and
in promotion of the rule of law.343
339. Also known as the Gregorian Revolution, the struggle involved a new way of ap-
pointing the Pope without the intervention of civil authorities. So strong were the claims
of universal power that the dramatic culmination of the effort occurred in 1076 when Pope
Gregory VII excommunicated German King Henry IV forcing him eventually to appear
barefoot as a penitent before the castle gate at Canossa. This was the triumph of an ex-
treme interpretation of Augustine's City of God and resulted in the Roman Pontiff alone
being called universal, with power to dispose or reinstate bishops or to dispose of Empe-
rors, but he himself cannot be judged by anyone. WALKER, supra note 335, at 204-11; see
also Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: A Historical Perspective, in NOEL B. REYNOLDS & W.
COLE DURHAM JR., RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT 29, 35 (1996).
340. BERMAN, supra note 337, at 87-88.
341. Legal historian Harold J. Berman rejects the view of many scholars that Western
political science originated in classical Greek thought. Id. at 275. Berman asserts that the
Investiture Controversy was the seminal event in the formation of the Western legal tradi-
tion that has survived until the present time. Id. Further, from the Twelfth Century on,
the church developed its own legal system as well as its own profession of canon lawyers,
laying the foundation of the Western legal tradition. Id. at 7-10. Berman identifies ten
characteristics of the Western legal tradition, six of which came into existence at this time,
and four of which we inherited from the Roman legal system. Id. at 7-10. He further la-
ments that the separation of religion and law in the current period has undermined the six
traditions instituted in the twelfth century. Id. at 165.
342. Creeds, supra note 153, at 43 (emphasis in original). Commentator E. Rosenstock-
Huessy states, with only slight exaggeration, "in western civilization, at least since Gre-
gory VII, two sovereign powers have always balanced each other. This, and this alone, has
created European freedom.'" Id. at 44 (citing E. ROSENSTOCK-HUESSY, OUT OF
REVOLUTION 543 (1938)).
343. BERMAN, supra note 337, at 292-94. Berman states:
The idea of the secular state, which was implicit in the Papal Revolution from
its inception, and the reality of the secular state, which emerged out of the
historical struggle between ecclesiastical and secular forces that constituted
the Papal Revolution, were in essence the idea and the reality of the state
ruled by law, a "law state."
Id. at 292. Berman further suggests that the modern concept of the rule of law differs from
its earlier form in two respects. First, it differs in that the separation of legislative, admin-
istrative, and judicial powers replaced the concept of concurrent jurisdictions and mutual
respect existing between church law and state law. Id. Second, "[iun the later period, that
transcendent reality was found in human rights, democratic values, and other related be-
liefs. In the earlier period it had been found in divine and natural justice." Id. at 294.
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Two doctrinal issues summarize the Reformation debate. First,
the reformers asserted that scripture alone ("sola scriptura") was
the final authority on all issues of faith and practice, while the
Roman Catholic Church asserted that the decisions of historic
church councils reflected an oral tradition of equal authority with
the Bible.3" Second, the reformers asserted that man's salvation
was by faith alone ("sola fide") without any works of penance,
while the Roman Catholic Church asserted that certain acts on
the part of man were necessary as part of a person's forgiveness
of sins committed after salvation.34 Luther perceived from scrip-
ture that man's heart must be changed before he can come to
God, and that God decides whose heart He will change.346 This is
the doctrine of "predestination" or "election" and its implications
are profound.34 v
Human dignity, the hallmark of the human rights regime, is
almost inconceivable without recognition from biblical sources
that man was created in the image of God, and that the descen-
dants of that first man are all entitled to equal dignity.34 The
concept that man's conscience should be free of external control
developed out of the doctrine of predestination; if God decides
who will be saved, the civil government, with its power of the
earthly sword, cannot affect the necessary internal religious ac-
ceptance. 49 Any such attempt would violate God's sovereignty.
344. The Westminster Confession of Faith states the principle of sola scriptura clearly:
"The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salva-
tion, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in scripture or by good and necessary con-
sequence may be deducted from scripture." THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH ch.
1.6 (1646), available at http://www.reformed.org/documents/wcf__withproofs/. This prin-
ciple recognizes that when man is to determine how to live and govern himself, he should
look to the scriptures. Historically, efforts have been made to discern the principles of civil
government from the scriptures. See, e.g., PHILIPPE DU PLESSIS-MORNAY, VINDICIAE
CONTRA TYRANNOS (1574); MOSES LOWMAN, A DISSERTATION ON THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT
OF THE HEBREWS (1743).
345. CREEDS, supra note 153, at 54.
346. WALKER, supra note 335, at 304.
347. Id. Responding to the challenge of Luther that man could not respond to the call of
God, the Roman Catholic Church reaffirmed the middle position, in which the doctrine of
"prevenient grace" became the pivotal doctrine between a recognition that man was help-
less in relation to salvation because of original sin and the position that salvation required
the assent of man's free will. See The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, ch. 5,
reprinted in PHILIP SCHAFF, THE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM 92 (1877).
348. See CREEDS, supra note 153, at 59.
349. See id.
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Prior to the Reformation, society was conceived as constituting
a single Christian commonwealth. 3 0 The Reformation introduced
new churches into a world dominated by the Roman Catholic
Church, resulting in conflict and persecution.351 Persecution of
French Protestants (called Huguenots)352 culminated on August
24, 1572 with the infamous St. Bartholomew's Day massacre of
many high ranking Protestants.353 Protestants responded by de-
veloping theories of resistance against governments that broke
their covenants with the people, i.e., the social contract.354 The
350. Harold J. Laski, Historical Introduction to JUNIUS BRUTUS, A DEFENCE OF
LIBERTY AGAINST TYRANTS: A TRANSLATION OF VINDICIA CONTRA TYRANNOS 2 (Burt
Franklin 1972) (1924) ("From the fall of the Roman empire until [Luther's] emergence, po-
litical thought was always dominated by the notion of a single Christian commonwealth.").
351. Id. at 1-4.
352. Paul Fuhrmann notes:
Historians especially look at French Protestantism as unique. Basically, it
rested neither on the princes, as in Germany, nor on kings, as in England,
nor on democratic patriotism, as in Switzerland, nor on certain families, nor
on racial reasons. It rested on the Bible. It produced thousands of martyrs...
a king ... a president of the republic ... a premier ... brilliant philosophers.
.. theologians, and... writers ....
PAUL T. FUHRMANN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GREAT CREEDS OF THE CHURCH 103 (1960).
The same author also states:
French Calvinism was no longer a church or society of saints but a party, a
Republic, a world of men and women-a new world in formation wherein pa-
gan, Christian, medieval, and Renaissance ideas and ways of life were mixed.
From these contradictions of laws and customs, from these disorders of war
and hazards of life, an energetic type of man came to light. He was the Hu-
guenot. The Huguenot was a unique combination of opposite qualities held in
equilibrium: passion and reason, ardent faith and profound reflection, intense
activity and voluntary self-discipline, Stoicism and Christianity.
Paul T. Fuhrmann, Philip Mornay and the Huguenot Challenge to Absolutism, in
CALVINISM AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 46, 61 (George L. Hunt ed., 1965) [hereinafter
Fuhrmann, Huguenot Challenge].
353. Id. at 46; Laski, supra note 350, at 13.
354. See John T. McNeill, John Calvin on Civil Government, in CALVINISM AND THE
POLITICAL ORDER, supra note 360, at 23, 23. Calvin recognized contradictory duties in the
individual who must obey the state authorities, even tyrants, while at the same time ty-
rants ruled only through the authority of God. JOHN CALVIN, CALVIN: INSTITUTES OF THE
CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1518 (John T. McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., Westminster
Press 1960). He resolved this contradiction by finding in the intermediate magistrates
representatives of the people charged with responsibility to restrain the higher authority.
Id. at 1519. In a famous passage in the Institutes of Christian Religion, Calvin charges the
intermediate magistrates to curb the tyranny of kings and likens them to the Ephori who
opposed kings in Sparta, the Demarchs to the senate in Athens, and the Tribunes of the
people to consuls among the Romans that had a profound effect on succeeding generations
that wished to resist tyranny. Id. Calvin may be indebted to Zwingli for the "ephors" anal-
ogy. McNeill, supra, at 41. That chapter, "Constitutional defenders of the people's free-
dom," sets forth Calvin's theory of resistance. CALVIN, supra, at 1518-19. Calvin's doc-
trines became influential in France (the Huguenots), Holland (Dutch Reformed), England
(Puritans), and in Scotland (Presbyterians). Herbert D. Foster, The Political Theories of
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name "Monarchomachists," i.e., enemies of the monarchy35 was
applied to persons such as Philip Mornay, the reputed author of
Vindiciae contra tyrannos [Vindication of Liberty Against Ty-
rants].356 In Vindiciae, Mornay sees two pacts ("contracts" or "co-
venants"): one between God (the king) and the people, and the
other between the people and the king.357 The law of the covenant
was God's law."' According to the habit of the Monarchomachists,
Mornay makes the king subject to the law, and if the king breaks
the law, he becomes a tyrant and must be resisted. 359 However, it
is not the people who judge when the king breaks the law; rather,
it is the lower level magistrates who represent the nation.36 °
Thus, the right to resist tyranny exists.361 Mornay and the Mon-
Calvinists Before the Puritan Exodus to America, 21 AM. HIST. REV. 481, 481-82 (1916).
355. In 1574, Theodore Beza, Calvin's successor in Geneva, anonymously published De
Jure Magistratum, in which he used the civil covenant to justify resistance to tyrants, ar-
guing that God had a covenant with every nation to obey His laws and the people a cove-
nant with the ruler to obey God's law. Charles J. Butler, Religious Liberty and Covenant
Theology 19 (Apr. 1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University) (on file with
author). Monarchomachists summarized that consent makes the king and that kings can
be resisted. It was the militant writings of the Monarchomachists (Calvinists) "at the ori-
gin of the revolution which from the 18th to the 19th centuries gave birth and growth to
the parliamentary democracies of Anglo-Saxon type." Fuhrmann, Huguenot Challenge,
supra note 352, at 50 & 197 n.6 (citing E. JARRY, LES TEMPS MODERNES 101 (1959)); see
also JOHN WITTE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM 81-141 (2007) (providing an extensive analysis of Beza's
impact).
356. Mornay was a French nobleman, theologian, soldier, and statesman, who was
widely thought to be Junius Brutus, the author of Vindiciae contra tyrannos. Laski, supra
note 350, at 57-59. Voltaire described Mornay as: "That virtuous support of the party of
error! Who, always showing his zeal and his prudence, Served equally his church and his
France; Censor of courtisans, but of the court beloved, Bold enemy of Rome and by Rome
Esteemed." GEORGE M. READ, HISTORIC STUDIES IN VAUD, BERNE, AND SAVOY 306 (1897)
(author's translation).
357. Laski, supra note 350, at 71.
358. Id. at 87-88.
359. Id. at 96, 99.
360. Id. at 97.
361. The four parts of Vindiciae raise and answer the following questions:
(1) Must subjects obey a prince when his orders are contrary to the will of
God? Answer: Kingship presupposes a contract between God and king and a
contract between king and people. The orders of a prince ought not to be pre-
ferred to God's will. Duties to God come first.
(2) Is it legitimate to resist a prince who violates God's law and ruins the
church? Answer: When the prince ruins religion, he ought to be resisted. Ma-
gistrates have control over the prince. Private men ought to offer a passive
resistance until magistrates call them to arms.
(3) Does the same apply to purely secular interests? Answer: Men have estab-
lished kingship for security abroad and at home. Kings ought to enforce the
law. A first kind of tyrants are usurpers. These are outlaws; any citizen can
kill them. A second kind of tyrants are legitimate kings who neglect their du-
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archomachists set forth the four great principles of government:
"sovereignty of the nation, political contract, representative gov-
ernment, and the separation of powers.""6 2
Described by von Gierke as a watershed of modern political
ideas, Johannes Althusius developed the covenantal views of
Mornay and others into a federal theory of society. 63 Recognizing
that God has not made man self-sufficient but has infused in man
the instinct for society, Althusius builds his system of covenanted
associations upon the family as the basic unit of society.3 64 Indi-
vidual rights are derived solely through association in the family,
which makes up the village or the region.3 6' The magistrates at
ties. Officers and nobles ought to lead them back to duty even by force. This
is the reason why officers and magistrates exist. Their destroying tyranny
serves the state.
(4) Ought neighboring princes help those who are afflicted for cause of reli-
gion or oppressed by tyrants? Answer: There is only one church whose head is
Jesus Christ. If a member is stricken, all others ought to help him. As for civ-
ic affairs, charity ought to move a prince to defend the oppressed and force
tyrants back to reason.
Fuhrmann, Huguenot Challenge, supra note 352, at 54 & 198 n.24 (citing RAOUL PATRY,
PHILIPPE Du PLESSIS-MORNAY-UN HUGUENOT HOMME D'ETAT 277-78 (1933)).
362. Id. at 64. Fuhrmann describes Mornay's conviction that truth does not require
force to prevail and that force can make hypocrites. Id. at 63. The Huguenots built their
system of government on the Bible, and their heritage to the Calvinist tradition was self-
government. Id. at 61-62. Fuhrmann states:
The greatest quality of the Huguenot was indeed the ability to govern him-
self. And this control of self, this moral sovereignty of the person, brought
about an entirely new idea and type of individual, social, and political life. We
have here, not an equalitarian and flat democracy, but a varied society, hence
a colorful society, hence a free society.
Id. at 62.
363. See generally Butler, supra note 355, at 167-76 (citing OTTO FRIEDRICH VON
GIERKE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THEORY 20 (Bernard Freyd trans., 1966)).
Gierke notes that Althusius adopted the views of the French Monarchomachi on popular
sovereignty and on the right to resistance against rulers who violate their contract with
the people. VON GIERKE, supra, at 17. Further, Althusius develops the theory of the abso-
lute inalienability of sovereign rights by the people in language later picked up by Jean
Jacques Rousseau. Id. Althusius was accused of supporting the Presbyterian error of popu-
lar sovereignty and of having been seduced by Junius Brutus in his youth. Id. at 17.
364. See JOHANNES ALTRusius, THE POLITICS OF JOHANNES ALTRUSIUS 22-27 (Frede-
rick S. Carney trans., 1964).
365. Althusius states:
Certain political writers eliminate, wrongly in my judgment, the doctrine of
the conjugal and kinship private association from the field of politics and as-
sign it to economics. Now these associations are the seedbed of all private and
public associational life. The knowledge of other associations is therefore in-
complete and defective without this doctrine of conjugal and kinship associa-
tion, and cannot be rightly understood without it.
Id. at 26.
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each level are bound by limits set by God's decalogue and public
opinion. 36 Because of the diversity of religious views in society,
Althusius would avoid conflict by being tolerant of minority
views. 67
The work of Samuel Rutherford, author of Lex Rex, was partic-
ularly influential3 68 in asserting covenant ideas in Scotland.369 Lex
Rex adopts Mornay's treatment in Vindiciae of three parties to
the covenant and asserts that God supersedes all political author-
ity.7 He recognizes the right of the people to choose the form of
366. Althusius notes:
The precepts of the Decalogue are included to the extent that they infuse a
vital spirit into the association and symbiotic life that we teach, they carry a
torch before the social life that we seek, and that they prescribe and consti-
tute a way, rule, guiding star, and boundary for human society. If anyone
would take them out of politics, he would destroy it; indeed, he would destroy
all symbiosis and social life among men. For what would human life be with-
out the piety of the first table of the Decalogue, and without the justice of the
second?
Id. at 8.
367. Althusius would have the commonwealth procure the community's religious
health by forming a religious covenant like Israel had in the Old Testament. See id. at 61-
62, 157-58. However, two factors move Althusius to the position of toleration. First, the
various units of society will take on different religious views, making uniformity impossi-
ble without damage to the whole. See id. at 72-73. Secondly, God may not have produced
faith in a large part of the community, and until God acts, the conscience of man must be
left free. See id. at 167. In his view of predestination, Althusius recognized the limits on
government's ability to promote religious belief. See id. at 167-69. Butler notes:
A magistrate in whose realm the true worship of God does not thrive should
take care that he not claim imperium over that area of the faith and religion
of men that exist only in the soul and conscience. God alone has imperium in
this area.... For this reason, faith is said to be a gift of God, not of Caesar.
... We are not able to command religion because no one is required to believe
against his will. Faith must be persuaded, not commanded, and taught, not
ordered.
Butler, supra note 363, at 167.
368. J. F. Maclear, Samuel Rutherford: The Law and the King, in CALVINISM AND THE
POLITICAL ORDER, supra note 359, at 65, 165; see also SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, A PEACEABLE
AND TEMPERATE PLEA FOR PAULS PRESBYTERIE IN SCOTLAND (1642). The notable Scottish
commissioners to the Westminster Assembly in 1643 were Rutherford, Baille, Gillespie,
and Henderson. Strangely, a recent history of Scotland makes no reference in its index to
Samuel Rutherford, author of LEX REX (Sprinkle 1982) (1644) [hereinafter LEX REX], (in-
sisting that the king was subject to the law), or George Gillespie, author of AARON'S ROD
BLOSSOMING 4 (LONDON 1864) (1646) (asserting that civil and ecclesiastical bodies were
separate in ancient Israel), both of whom attended the Westminster Assembly. See JAMES
G. LEYBURN, THE SCOTCH-IRISH: A SOCIAL HISTORY 374, 376 (1962).
369. Covenant ideas of being banded to God as a people were readily understood in
Scotland as consistent with the Scottish history of "banding," which involved "shared au-
thority, local initiative, voluntary commitment, and mutual contractual obligations often
for the common defense. See Maclear, supra note 368, at 68-70, 72-73.
370. Rutherford asserts:
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political authority and acknowledges that all forms are lawful.37'
Rutherford is credited with establishing in Scotland an "enduring
national tradition disposed to challenge oppressive government
and refer political decision to moral law."37 2 Rutherford and the
Scots have had an enormous effect on the formation of the mod-
ern world.3 73 At the time of the American Revolution, Scots were
fierce advocates for independence and most feared that King
George III would seek to place an Anglican bishop over the colo-
nies.3 74
[Tihe Lord and the people giveth the crown by one and the same action; ...
seeing the People maketh him a King covenant-wise and conditionally, so he
rule according to God's law, and the people resigning their power to him for
their safety .... It is certain God giveth a King that same way by that very
same act of the people.
LEX REX, supra note 368, at 57.
371. Id. at 31.
372. Maclear, supra note 368, at 86. The true theme of Lex Rex is that "[aill rightful
authority lies in law, whether it is authority of king, estates, populace, or kirk. The king is
truly king only when he identifies himself with the law, and only to the degree that he
succeeds in voicing and implementing law." Id. at 77; see also id. ("Rex est lex viva, anima-
ta, loquens lex: The king is a living, breathing, and speaking Law."). Maclear quotes Ru-
therford's great faith in the people as expressed in Lex Rex: "The people have a natural
throne of policie in their conscience to give warning, and materially sentence against the
King as a Tyrant .... Where Tyranny is more obscure .... the King keepeth possession;
but I deny that Tyranny can be obscure long." Id.
373. The influence of Scotland on the modern world is extensive. In ranking the 100
most influential persons in history, Michael Hart marvels that five of the top fifty are from
Scotland, a country constituting one-eighth of one percent of the world's population.
MICHAEL H. HART, THE 100 A RANKING OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL PERSONS IN HISTORY
524 (rev. ed. 1992). Another author, in speaking of the philosophical developments in Scot-
land, states:
[T]here is no simple explanation for the abundant crop of genius which grew
from that proud race of shepherd-warriors in the 18th century ...
[Clenturies of sophisticated intellectual debates about theology had shar-
pened the minds of Scotsmen to the nuances of ideas and arguments; but
even this does not quite suffice to explain the bold brash ideas which emerged
in Edinburgh and Glasgow.
YUVAL LEVIN, TYRANNY OF REASON: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENTIFIC OUTLOOK 152 (2001). Yuval then describes the philosophical contributions of
David Hume and Adam Smith. Id. at 152-67.
374. Cf. LEYBURN, supra note 368, at 1060.
The crucial issue was church government.... When James fumed that "a
Scottish Presbytery was well fitteth with the monarchy as God and the Devil.
No bishop, no King!", he was referring to the representative government of
the Presbytery and the independence of its ministers .... Most of the difficul-
ties of Presbyterians with Independents in the time of Cromwell would have
been avoided if the Presbyterian form of government had been given up. Yet
this very feature had endeared itself quickly to the Scots, and "persecution"
by the Established Church consisted of trying to break down that attach-
ment .... The emotionalism connected with the Solemn League and Cove-
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During the English Civil War, Rutherford advocated an inde-
pendent church with a national covenant, permitting the use of
the sword to enforce religious uniformity (a position of intoler-
ance).375 Jurist, Hebrew scholar, and legal positivist John Selden
argued for tolerance, allowing the state the authority over reli-
gious affairs;... and Henry Vane, close friend of Roger Williams
and confidant of Cromwell, advocated for religious liberty, assert-
ing that the doctrine of predestination demanded religious prefe-
rence be independent of government. 7
nant is truly remarkable.
Id. It was in Scotland that the system of Calvinistic Presbyterianism, formed in Geneva by
the reformer, John Calvin, took root and thrived. There the church became free of the civil
power. Schaff states that it was
wrought into the bone and sinew of the nation which seems to be predestined
for such a manly, sturdy, God-fearing, solid, persevering type of Christianity.
• . . In no other country and Church do we find such fidelity and tenacity,
such unswerving devotion to the genius of the Reformation; such union of me-
taphysical subtlety with religious fervor and impetuosity; such general inter-
est in ecclesiastical councils and enterprizes; such jealousy for the rights and
self-government of the Church, such loyalty to a particular denomination
combined with a generous interest in Christ's kingdom at large; such reve-
rence for God's holy Word and holy day, that after the hard and honest toil of
the week lights up the poorest man's cottage one Saturday night.
SCHAFF, supra note 347, at 695.
375. Maclear, supra note 368, at 65.
376. Elisabeth F. Hirsch, John Cotton and Roger Williams: Their Controversy Concern-
ing Religious Liberty, 10 CHURCH HIST. 38, 39 (1941). Although not a member of the
Westminster Assembly, England's greatest theologian John Owen, chaplain to Cromwell
and Dean of Christ Church and Vice-Chancellor of Oxford (William Penn and John Locke
were Owen's students), advocated a covenanted toleration. William Warren Sweet, The
American Colonial Environment and Religious Liberty, 4 CHURCH HIST. 43, 54-55 (1935).
377. Henry Vane was born in England and studied in Geneva and France before travel-
ing to Massachusetts Bay where he was elected governor at the age of 23. WILLIAM M.
IRELAND, THE LIFE OF SIR HENRY VANE: THE YOUNGER 33, 38, 70 (1971). While there,
Vane became familiar with Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson, both of whom were be-
ing persecuted for conscience's sake. See id. at 75-78. Vane's efforts on behalf of Hutchin-
son led to his defeat and return to England. Id. at 77-80, 90-91. On his return, he became
a member of Parliament, a confidant of Cromwell, and a member of the Westminster As-
sembly, where he pleaded for religious liberty. See id. at 95, 210, 279, 407. By separating
the civil covenant from Christ's sovereign predestination over salvation Vane established
religious freedom asking:
For why shouldst thou set at naught thy brother in matters of his faith and
conscience, and herein intrude into the proper office of Christ, whether gov-
ernors or governed,. .. [who] by his [Christ's] decision only are capable of be-
ing declared with certainty to be in the right or in the wrong?
Butler, supra note 355, at 277 (citing HENRY VANE, HEALING QUESTIONS 4 (1656)). With
the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660, Charles II wanted Vane's head. IRELAND
supra, at 480-81. Vane had been instrumental in precipitating the Civil War and in sup-
porting Cromwell. See id. at 363-64, 383-84. After presenting his defense by proving the
King subordinate to God, the Law, and Parliament, Vane was martyred. Id. at 494.
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In 1644, Roger Williams returned to England from Massachu-
setts Bay, having been banned from the colony because of con-
flicts with the church authorities. 8 With the help of Henry Vane,
Williams secured a Parliamentary charter for Rhode Island that
was verified by a royal charter in 1663."1 This charter specifically
granted the colony religious liberty.80 Williams's heavy emphasis
on predestination as the operative fact in salvation led to a posi-
tion of religious liberty.38 The Rhode Island colony was the first
experiment with religious liberty.8 2
Williams based his position that the state was prohibited from
enforcing religion on Romans 13.113 Still, Williams called on citi-
zens to be subject to lawful authority because there is no authori-
ty except from God.384 By admonishing the people to give proper
respect to those deserving respect (an expansion of the Fifth
378. EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: ROGER WILLIAMS IN AMERICA 37-38,
57-58 (1991). While Williams was an assistant to Sir Edward Coke, he learned of the
practice in the Star Chamber. William R. Garrett, Religion, Law, and the Human Condi-
tion, 47 SOC. ANALYSIS 1, 2 (1987). He encountered immediate conflict by standing apart
from the established church and advocating for reimbursing the Indians for taking their
land. Id. at 23.
379. GAUSTAD, supra note 378, at 61-63, 157-58.
380. Id. at 158.
381. Id. at 95-97.
382. Id. at 157-58.
383. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENANT OF PERSECUTION FOR CAUSE OF
CONSCIENCE DISCUSSED IN CONFERENCE BETWEEN TRUTH AND PEACE 90 (2001 reprint of
1644 original). Romans 13:1-9 provides:
Let every soul be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no author-
ity except from God, and the authorities that exist are appointed by God.
Therefore whoever resists the authority resists the ordinance of God and
those who resist will bring judgment on themselves .... But if you do evil, be
afraid; for he does not bear the sword in vain; for he is God's minister, an
avenger to execute wrath on him who practices evil. Therefore you must be
subject, not only because of wrath but also for conscience' sake. For because
of this you also pay taxes, for they are God's ministers attending continually
to this very thing. Render therefore to all their due .... Owe no one anything
except to love one another .... For the commandments, "You shall not com-
mit adultery," "You shall not murder," "You shall not steal," "You shall not
bear false witness," "You shall not covet;" and if there is any other command-
ment, are all summed up in this saying, namely, "You shall love your neigh-
bor as yourself."
Romans 13:1-9 (New King James).
Jesus recognized the division of the commandments into two tables: in responding to the
question, "which is the great commandment," his answer was to love the Lord your God
(the first table), which was the first great commandment, and the second, like the first,
was to love your neighbor as yourself (the second table). See Matthew 22:34-40 (New King
James).
384. See WILLIAMS, supra note 383, at 136-141.
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Commandment: "honor thy mother and father .... ") and admo-
nishing them to love one another because love does not commit
adultery, kill, steal, bear false witness, or covet (the Sixth
through the Tenth Commandments), Romans 13 limits the power
of civil authorities to enforce the second table of the Ten Com-
mandments."8 5 Thus, according to Williams, enforcement of the
first table was the exclusive providence of God.386 The civil magi-
strate had no authority to discern between true and false reli-
gion.3 8
7
Williams's concept that government has no authority to enter
into the area of religion is fundamental to James Madison's con-
cepts of religious liberty, as set forth in his famous Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments in Virginia. 8 Mad-
ison made clear that civil society had no authority over religion,
as man's commitment to his Creator precedes his commitment to
385. Id. at 89-90; see Exodus 20:11.
386. See id. WILLIAMS, supra note 383, at 3.
[Ilt is the will and command of God that, since the coming of his Son the Lord
Jesus, a permission of the most paganish, Jewish, Turkish, or anti-Christian
consciences and worships be granted to all men in all nations and countries,
and they are only to be fought against with that sword which is only, in soul
matters, able to conquer, to wit, the sword of God's Spirit, the Word of God.
Id.
387. Williams finds further support for his position in the parable of the tares where he
includes "false worshipers, idolaters, and in particular properly, anti-Christians" within
the definition of "tares" which must be tolerated in the "world" (that is outside the church)
until the end of time. Id. at 61. Williams sees the tares as "sinners" whose religious trans-
gressions must be tolerated in society generally, but whose second table violations can be
prosecuted as any other law breaker. See id. at 62-63. Williams notes that the misinter-
pretation of this parable has caused much bloodshed in the church of Christ. See id. at 53-
69. Williams states:
I answer that as the civil state keeps itself with a civil guard, in case these
tares shall attempt aught against the peace and welfare of it, let such civil of-
fenses be punished; and yet, as tares opposite to Christ's kingdom, let their
worship and consciences be tolerated.
Id. at 63. The key to the parable is Christ's interpretation that "[tihe field is the world." Id.
at 61. Williams also held firmly that the family was the foundation of civil society and that
government operates with the consent of the people. Although others had interpreted the
field as the church, Williams's interpretation allows that all manner of unbelievers can
live within society without fear of persecution for conscience's sake. See id. at 59. The
church is the proper place to root out false doctrines and punish sinners. See id. at 88. But
the church's weapons are solely spiritual. See id. at 89-90. Furthermore, the civil magi-
strate is charged with the duty of enforcing all manner of violations of the second table of
the commandments, and such enforcement should be sufficient to create a society in which
all manner of men can live at peace. Further, he admonishes ministers to avoid stirring up
the civil magistrate to up-root the tares in the community. Id. at 65; see also id. at 62 (ac-
knowledging the duty to punish violators of the civil peace).
388. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. Of Twp. Of Ewiing, 330 U.S. 1 app. At 63 (1947).
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Civil Society."8 9 Further, Madison recognizes the right to resist
any movement restricting liberties °.3 " The familiar words are:
Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, "that
Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence.". . . It is the duty of every man to render to the
Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable
to him. This duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of ob-
ligation, to the claims of Civil Society.
391
The period after 1650 was characterized by scholars such as
Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, and Mill, all of whom
built on the Reformation foundation.392 Their contributions were
in many ways consistent with those Reformation foundations.
The English Civil War, American Revolutionary War, and the
American Civil War were applications of Mornay's Vindiciae. It
was not until the post-World War II era that the consistency
broke down because the covenant standards, based on the second
table of the Ten Commandments, weakened as a governing moral
consensus. Society demanded individual moral liberty, and gov-
ernments assumed ever greater power over economic and social
issues.
V. CONCLUSION
Human rights are built on undefined concepts of human digni-
ty, rule of law, and universality. Perhaps the most serious prob-
lem with the assertion of the human rights regime on such a
shaky intellectual foundation is that the concept of "rights" can
expand beyond measure; thus, the power required to enforce
them will become greater and greater, and there will be nothing
to restrain governmental abuses. Americans see this today as
their government continues to grow and expand in such a way as
389. Id. at 64.
390. Id. at 65.
391. Id. at 64; see TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 133 (1998).
392. See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 317; DAVID HUME, ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON
VARIOUS SUBJECTS (1849); IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Werner S. Plu-
har trans. 1996) (1781); JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,
reprinted in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE, supra note 317, at 182
(1690); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS
(John Gray ed., 1991) (1869); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON SOCIAL CONTRACT, reprinted
in ROUSSEAU'S POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 317, at 84 (1762).
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to dominate other countries without any seeming restraint other
than economic limitations, which to date have not been an effec-
tive restraining force. The answer to this should be the rule of
law, but when the law itself can be changed as easily as the
budget, it also becomes ineffective.
Mankind needs a standard that is not man-made. That is
where Williams's position, derived from Romans 13, presents a
solution.393 If government recognized its duty to restrain viola-
tions of the second table of the Commandments, it would have a
standard that is not man-made. While that standard is stated in
the negative, the reformers always asserted the corollary in the
form of a positive duty. For example, if the commandment said
"thou shall not steal," the corollary would be "thou shall strive to
protect the property of others." If anything, the second table of
the Ten Commandments is secular in that it pertains only to mat-
ters between men, which any good government should enforce.
They have nothing to do with religious enforcement in an area
where government should have no power to enter. Like the re-
formers, modern scholars should strive to discover truth, and the
inescapable by-product will be freedom. The scriptural call is for
religious liberty, which is consistent with governmental enforce-
ment of the second table-a result that may well find common
ground in most other societies.
393. WILLIAMS, supra note 383, at 89-90.
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